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Abstract 
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT) is regarded as one of the most 
efficacious psychological treatments of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) 
and is recommended in the recent National Institute for Clinical Excellence 
guidelines (NICE, 2006). Despite this, comparative studies have consistently 
shown CBT to be no more effective than Exposure and Response Prevention 
(ERP; McLean et al., 2001). Recently, cognitive theories of OCD have identified 
specific cognitive mechanisms involved in symptom-based subtypes of OCD 
(OCCWG, 1997,2005). It is possible that specifically targeting these 
mechanisms may increase the efficacy of the cognitive component of treatment 
(McKay et al., 2004). This study aims to expand on recent research that suggests 
that repeated checking behaviours are maladaptive coping strategies that serve to 
maintain the difficulty (Rachman, 2002). Because previous research suggests that 
individuals with checking rituals are more likely to have an intolerance of 
uncertainty (Tolin et al., 2003), it is possible that they will also use specific 
cognitive safety behaviours to try to manage their anxiety during exposure. The 
current study hypothesized that the use of a memory search and a reasoning task 
during exposure would lead to a decrease in memory detail and confidence, and 
an increase in urge to check and anxiety. Data were collected from five 
participants currently on the waiting list for clinical psychology services. A 
single case experimental design with counterbalancing was used to test each 
hypothesis. The results of the study were mixed and showed little change in all 
four experimental conditions. Furthermore, mean change scores were 
inconsistent with the research hypotheses. That is, the use of a memory search 
and a reasoning task did not appear to have a maladaptive effect. The clinical and 
research implications of the results are discussed along with several limitations 
of the study. On the basis of the findings, it was concluded that OCD is a 
heterogeneous disorder and that further research is needed to examine the 
suitability of subtyping in OCD and the implications this has for treatment. 
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Introduction and Literature Review of Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder 
Overview of the Thesis 
Despite a theoretical move towards looking at subtypes of Obsessive 
Compulsive Disorder (OCD), treatments carried out in clinical trials still tend to 
follow a more traditional and generalized Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) 
approach. It is possible that this lack of specificity may be affecting the efficacy 
of treatments for OCD and that future research needs to be based on model- 
relevant rationale (McKay et al., 2004). Recent theories of OCD (checking 
subtype) suggest that checking behaviours are maladaptive coping strategies that 
serve to maintain the difficulty (Rachman, 2002). Previous research supports this 
view. For example, Van den Hout and Kindt (2003a, 2003b) found that repeated 
checking decreased the vividness, detail and confidence an individual had of 
their memory. People who engage in overt checking behaviours may also use 
cognitive safety behaviours which maintain their anxiety. However, research to 
date has not yet addressed this issue. The primary aim of the current study is to 
examine the affect of manipulating the safety behaviours in individuals with 
OCD (checking subtype) when they are exposed to fear provoking stimuli. The 
identification of such strategies should expand on recent theories and contribute 
to the refinement and improvement of cognitive treatments for OCD. 
1.2 Definition 
OCD is classified as an anxiety disorder, characterised by clinically 
significant obsessions or compulsions that usually occur together (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000; Taylor, 2002). Obsessions are defined as recurrent 
persistent thoughts, impulses, or images that occur repeatedly and are 
experienced as intrusive, inappropriate and distressing (Swinson, Antony, 
Rachman, & Richter, 1998). The content of the obsessions are not simply 
excessive worries about day-to-day problems and are unlikely to relate to real- 
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life events. The most common obsessions reported are in relation to fears of 
contamination, aggressive thoughts, need for order and fear of making mistakes 
(O'Connor, Aardema, & Pelissier, 2005). Compulsions are defined as repetitive 
behaviours or mental acts that an individual feels compelled to perform, often 
with a desire to resist. Compulsions are excessive and are unconnected in a 
realistic way to the events they are aimed to prevent (Swinson et al., 1998). The 
most common compulsions reported are checking and cleaning (Muller & 
Roberts, 2005). For a diagnosis of OCD, The ICD- 10 provides the following 
description: 
The essentialfeature is recurrent obsessional thoughts or compulsive 
acts. Obsessional thoughts are ideas, images, or impulses that enter the 
patient's mind again and again in a stereotypedform. They are almost 
invariably distressing and the patient often tries, unsuccessfully, to resist 
them. They are, however, recognized as his or her own thoughts, even 
though they are involuntary and often repugnant. Compulsive acts or 
rituals are stereotyped behaviours that are repeated again and again. 
They are not inherently enjoyable, nor do they result in the completion of 
inherently useful tasks. Theirfunction is to prevent some objectively 
unlikely event, often involving harm to or caused by the patient, which he 
or shefears might otherwise occur. Usually, this behaviour is recognized 
by the patient as pointless or ineffectual and repeated attempts are made 
to resist. Anxiety is almost invariably present. If compulsive acts are 
resisted the anxiety gets worse. 
World Health Organization (WHO, 2006, T F42) 
Along with the presence of obsessions and/or compulsions, DSM-IV suggests 
that the following criteria should be met when making a diagnosis of OCD: 
1. At some point during the course of the disorder, the person recognises 
that the obsessions or compulsions are excessive or unreasonable. 
2. The obsessions or compulsions cause marked distress, are time 
consuming (take more than I hour a day), or significantly interfere with 
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the person Is normal routine, occupational (or academic) functioning, or 
usual social activities or relationships. 
3. If another Axis I disorder is present, the content of the obsessions or 
compulsions is not restricted to it (e. g., preoccupation withfood in the 
presence of an Eating Disorder; hair pulling in the presence of 
Trichotillomania; concern with appearance in the presence of Body 
Dysmorphic Disorder; or guilty ruminations in the presence of Major 
Depressive Disorder). 
4. The disturbance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a 
substance or a general medical condition. 
American Psychiatric Association (APA, 2000, pp. 456-463) 
1.3 Prevalence and Chronicity 
Accurate prevalence rates are difficult to determine owing to the number 
of people who do not seek treatment. Estimated lifetime prevalence rates in the 
UK are suggested to be around 1.1% (Singleton, Bumpstead, & O'Brien, 2001) 
with average age of onset being in the early twenties (Abramowitz, 1997). For 
some, onset is thought to be associated with an environmental trigger which 
involves either an increase in responsibility (e. g., a new baby, a promotion at 
work) or a loss of some kind (e. g., death of a loved one, loss of employment) 
(Rasmussen & Tsuang, 1986). However, the majority of individuals do not report 
a trigger and pre-morbid subclinical precursors are often thought to be common 
(O'Connor et al., 2005). OCD has a chronic, fluctuating course and can have a 
significant impact on an individual's professional, social and family life if left 
untreated. Symptoms usually fluctuate throughout the course of the disorder and 
although obsessions and compulsions may evolve over time, there are no 
reported cases of spontaneous remissions (O'Connor et al., 2005). A follow-up 
study by Skoog and Skoog (1999) highlighted the poor outcome for people with 
this disorder. They found that, even after almost fifty years of illness, only 20% 
of the sample achieved full remission, 28% showed sub-clinical symptoms, 44% 
continued to experience significant symptoms, and 8% deteriorated. Given that 
II 
individuals with OCD also commonly experience other affective symptoms of 
fear, anxiety, chronic worry, and depression, identifying effective interventions is 
extremely important (Swinson et al., 1998). 
1.4 Heterogeneity of OCD 
Although the DSM-IV diagnosis of OCD has reliably defined the 
syndrome, individuals seeking treatment have clinical presentations associated 
with many different types of obsessional concerns and compulsive behaviours, as 
well as different patterns of comorbidity and age of onset (McKay et al., 2004). 
This heterogeneity presents significant challenges to clinicians attempting to 
diagnose and treat the condition, and to researchers attempting to formulate 
comprehensive aetiological theories to develop treatment that is more effective 
(Calamari et al, 2006). The need for greater specificity in assessment and 
treatment strategies for OCD is particularly highlighted in studies of treatment 
outcome, which have been shown to differ according to symptoms. Van Oppen, 
Hoekstra, and Emmelkamp (1995), for example, compared the efficacy of 
Cognitive Therapy (CT) and Exposure Response Prevention (ERP) in clients 
with checking or washing rituals. Clients with checking rituals were shown to 
respond slightly better to treatment than washers, with CT having better 
outcomes than ERP. Similarly, McLean et al. (2001) found a significant 
relationship between symptom type and recovery status and Abramowitz, 
Franklin, Schwartz, and Furr (2003) found that people with hoarding 
compulsions were the least responsive to treatment. 
The broad range of symptoms seen in OCD along with the differential 
response to treatment has led researchers and clinicians to propose that important 
subtypes of OCD exist (McKay et al., 2004). Several methods for identifying 
symptom-based subtypes of OCD have been developed. For example, an early 
principal components factor analysis of the Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive 
Inventory (MOCI) in 100 clients yielded four factors: "checking, " "cleaning, " 
"slowness, " and "doubting" (Rachman, 2002). Since then, scales have become 
more comprehensive and include additional cognitive items. For example, the 
Yale-Brown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS) is organised into eight 
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obsession categories (aggressive, contamination, sexual, hoarding, symmetry, 
religious, somatic, miscellaneous) and seven compulsion categories (washing, 
checking, counting, ordering/arranging, hoarding, repeating, miscellaneous) 
(McKay et al., 2004). It is now generally accepted that symptoms on this scale 
represent the main OCD symptom types (Swinson et al., 1998). 
The existing literature on subtypes of OCD relies almost exclusively on 
overt symptoms as a basis for subtyping schemes (McKay et al., 2004). 
However, Calamari et al. (2006) argue that symptom-based subtyping is limited 
due to the way that similar symptoms may connect to very different underlying 
motivations. For example, in a recent study of clients with washing compulsions, 
two different motivations were identified: an attempt to prevent harm from germs 
and an attempt to remove evil (Calamari et al., 2004). In addition, Tallis (1996) 
argues that another motivation underlying washing compulsions is an effort to 
achieve an inner sense of completeness or perfection. The role of dysfunctional 
beliefs and appraisals in OCD is now well established in cognitive theory, with 
six belief domains suggested to be important (Obsessive Compulsive Cognitions 
Working Group, OCCWG, 1997). However, dysfunctional beliefs have also been 
shown to differ across symptom subtypes. For example, Rachman (1998) 
suggested that slowness, indecisiveness, and concerns about memory were more 
characteristic of checkers than cleaners. Recent research suggests that these 
differences could provide a means of forming new subgroups of OCD (e. g., 
Taylor et al., 2006) and raises the possibility that specialized cognitive and 
behavioural treatment procedures that target specific characteristics of OCD 
subtypes will be more effective than traditional treatment packages (McKay et 
al., 2004). 
1.5 OCD with Checking Compulsions 
Checking is one of the most common symptom-based subtypes of OCD 
and will be the focus of this thesis. Although information about the relative 
frequency of subtypes is incomplete, it is suggested that compulsive checking is 
more common than compulsive cleaning, with a ratio of approximately 4: 3 to 6: 3 
(Antony et al., 1997, as cited in Rachman, 2002; Henderson & Pollard, 1988). 
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Research into checking compulsions has further highlighted the heterogeneity of 
the disorder, with checking compulsions showing the most variability with 
respect to how they cluster in factor analytic studies (McKay et al., 2004). The 
checking behaviour may vary from being overt and obvious to covert and 
inaccessible to an observer (Rachman, 2002). It can also be carried out by proxy 
and can be protracted, thereby leading to intolerable slowness and poor time 
keeping. Although generally considered to be a form of preventative behaviour, 
reasons for checking are also thought to vary. Some checkers may report 
intrusions relating to harm (e. g., fire, theft) which they believe will actually 
increase the likelihood of the specified feared event occurring. Other checkers 
may have unwanted sexual or aggressive thoughts and may check to relieve 
doubt as to their actual dangerous behaviour. Finally, some individuals may 
overestimate the likelihood of making mistakes and feel overly responsible for 
potential disasters, and therefore check to ensure safety (McKay et al., 2004). 
1.6 Early Theories of OCD 
Early explanations of OCD were dominated by psychoanalytic theories 
and did not distinguish between different subtypes. Freud's (1909) 
conceptualisation of obsessional phenomena became the most influential theory 
in this field. Freud argued that anxiety derived from unresolved oedipal conflicts 
resulted in anal-sadistic regression, which the ego fends off through defence 
mechanisms such as reaction formation, intellectualisation, undoing and isolation 
(Freud, 1909). Within this model, the symptoms represent the client's 
unconscious struggle for control over drives that are unacceptable at a conscious 
level (Goodman, 2000). Psychoanalytic therapy for OCD was therefore based on 
attempts to modify obsessional symptoms and treat unconscious conflicts which 
were presumed to underline the symptoms. However, despite the popularity of 
this treatment, there was no evidence to suggest that obsessional thoughts or 
ritualistic behaviour decreased (Esman, 2001). Although psychoanalytic theory 
offered an explanation for the content of obsessions it failed to offer any insight 
into the underlying processes involved in the disorder and, hence, features little 
in the current literature. 
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1.7 Behavioural theories and treatment 
Early behavioural models of OCD were based on the basic principle of 
conditioning. This model hypothesizes that normal intrusive thoughts become 
associated with fear and anxiety through a classical conditioning process and this 
anxiety is then maintained by learned avoidance or escape responses (Taylor, 
2002). Rachman and Hodgson (1980) conducted a series of experimental studies 
to examine the applicability of this model to people suffering from OCD. As 
predicted by the model, they found that elicitation of the obsession was 
associated with increased anxiety and that this anxiety decreased if the client was 
then allowed to carry out a ritual. A person with washing compulsions, therefore, 
may have a conditioned fear of contamination. Avoidance and escape from 
6contaminated' stimuli (e. g., public toilets) will then persist as a way of reducing 
distress (Taylor, 2002). Some individuals with checking compulsions actually 
report increased levels of anxiety after performing their compulsions. However, 
it is argued that mildly anxiety-evoking behaviors might be considered as 
avoidance behaviors if they serve to prevent the occurrence of strong anxiety 
(Hennstein, 1969). For example, checking the oven may elicit anxiety in some 
clients but refraining from checking the oven is perceived as an even more 
anxiety-producing event because of the increased risk of an aversive event. 
Conditioning models led to what has been established as one of the most 
effective treatments for OCD, Exposure and Response Prevention (ERP). This 
model is based on the idea that anxiety usually decreases after sufficient duration 
of contact with the feared stimuli through the process of habituation (Bouvard, 
2002). Helping the client to prevent neutralizing or ritualising responses 
(response prevention) will ensure that adequate exposure is achieved. For 
example, an individual with contamination concerns would be encouraged to 
touch progressively 'dirtier' objects whilst refraining from cleaning or washing 
(Maltby & Tolin, 2003). For those clients who engage in more covert compulsive 
behaviours, exposure occurs on a cognitive level by focusing on the intrusive 
thoughts whilst the response prevention deals with the internal mental rituals 
(Frost & Steketee, 2002). 
ERP is often considered the psychological treatment of choice for OCD 
and is widely used in the UK (Abramowitz, 1997). Over the years a number of 
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clinical outcome studies have established that 40-97% of individuals with OCD 
show significant improvement after completing a 13-20 session course of ERP 
(Clark, 2005). For example, Foa and Kozak (1996) concluded that across ERP 
outcome studies the average percentage of individuals who showed symptomatic 
improvement was 83%. In addition, improvements post-treatment have been 
found to be maintained at up to 3.5 years follow-up (Goodman et al., 2000) and 
have shown significantly better maintenance of treatment gains when medication 
is discontinued (Abramowitz, 1997). 
Despite conditioning models leading to important advances in the 
understanding and treatment of OCD, both the model and ERP have important 
limitations (Taylor, 2005). Conditioning models have been criticized for their 
lack of specificity because they fail to differentiate between the theoretical 
conceptualization of different anxiety disorders and fail to adequately explain 
why some people become obsessional and others do not (Frost & Steketee, 
2002). ERP outcome studies have been criticized for failing to define clinical 
improvement (e. g., Foa & Kozak, 1996). Fisher and Wells (2005a) argue that the 
criteria for defining Empirically Supported Treatments (ESTs) focus 
predominantly on the relative efficacy, rather than the absolute efficacy of a 
particular treatment which is necessary, but not sufficient to demonstrate that an 
active treatment is superior to a control treatment. They suggest that studies 
should use the approach of Jacobson and Truax (1991) which requires clients to 
meet a two-fold criterion in order to be classified as recovered or having made 
clinically significant change. Other criticisms of ERP focus on the way that some 
clients are unable or unwilling to tolerate the distress associated with the 
exposure (Taylor, 2005). For example, Stanley and Turner (1995) concluded that 
only 63% of OCD clients responded favorably to ERP when refusal, drop-out, 
and non-response rates were taken into consideration. Further, follow up studies 
indicate that even if OCD clients are treated successfully with ERP, the majority 
continue to experience some obsessive-compulsive symptoms (Abramowitz, 
1998) along with relapses and reoccurrence of OCD (Foa & Kozak, 1996). With 
the added limitation of co-morbid depression hindering the effects of ERP 
(Steketee, Chambless, & Tran, 2001) it is argued that alternatives are still needed 
(Wilson & Chambless, 2005). 
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1.8 Cognitive Models of OCD 
1.8.1 Overview. 
Over the last decade, cognitive theories have dominated the literature on 
the causes, maintenance and treatment of OCD. Although a number of different 
models have been proposed over the years, they all share several basic features in 
common. First, cognitive models of OCD begin with the well-established finding 
that the unwanted, intrusive thoughts that make up an obsession are almost 
universally experienced. For example, research has shown that the form, and to 
some extent the content, of obsessions reported by non-psychiatric respondents 
and by obsessional clients are similar and usually reflect the person's current 
concerns (Rachman & De Silver, 1978). Secondly, it is argued that these 
cognitive intrusions (or concerns) develop into obsessions only when they are 
appraised as personally significant or threatening (Abramowitz, 2006). Thus, 
cognitive models all agree that the problem is not at the level of the intrusion but 
is instead at the level of the appraisal of the intrusion. 
Thirdly, compulsions are suggested to occur as a behavioural response to 
the anxiety created by the recurrent and persistent obsessive thoughts. 
Compulsions are therefore seen as an attempt to "put things right", to neutralise 
the effects of unacceptable, intrusive obsessions (Rachman, Shafran, Trant, & 
Teachman, 1996). These behaviours can either be overt ritualistic behaviours, 
such as washing and checking, or covert attempts to neutralise the thought by 
mental effort in order to control or attenuate its negative impact (O'Connor et al., 
2005). Attempts at distracting oneself from the unwanted intrusions, however, 
paradoxically increase the frequency of intrusions, possibly because the 
distracters become reminders of the intrusions (Taylor, 2002). Originally 
proposed by Salkovskis (1985,1989), cognitive models therefore suggest two 
main reasons why such compulsions become persistent and excessive. First, they 
are reinforced by immediate distress reduction and by temporary removal of the 
unwanted thought and, secondly, they prevent the person from learning that their 
appraisals are unrealistic. 
17 
1.8.2 Dysfunctional beliefs in OCD. 
Cognitive theories of OCD all share the common principle that the 
misinterpretation of the significance of one's intrusive thoughts result from the 
dysfunctional beliefs or assumptions held by the individual which will influence 
their appraisal of the event (Salkovskis, 1985,1989; Rachman, 1997). 
Contemporary cognitive-behavioural models differ in that they each suggest 
different types of dysfunctional beliefs are relevant to the development and 
exacerbation of obsessive-compulsive symptoms (OCCWG, 2005). To facilitate 
research in this area, a number of measures have been developed to try to 
identify beliefs that are specific to OCD (see table I for a summary of published 
measures). However, it is argued that the number and diversity of these measures 
have created a confusing picture of the role of cognitive phenomena in OCD 
(OCCWG, 1997). In order to gain some consensus and assist in the development 
of interventions, therefore, the OCCWG (1997,2005) identified six belief 
domains believed to be of central importance to OCD: 1) inflated responsibility, 
2) thought-action fusion and other beliefs concerning the overimportance of the 
consequences of one's thoughts; 3) excessive concern about the importance of 
controlling one's thoughts; 4) overestimation of the probability and severity of 
threat; 5) intolerance of uncertainty; and 6) perfectionism. 
Table 1. Published measures assessing dysftinctional beliefs in OCD. 
Author(s) Instrument 
Clark et al. (2003) Meta-cognitive Beliefs Questionnaire 
Eisen et al. (1998) Brown Assessment of Beliefs Scale 
Foa et al. (1995) Fixity of Beliefs Questionnaire 
Freeston et al. (1993) Irrational Beliefs Regarding Obsessions 
Frost et al. ( 1990) Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale 
Frost et al. (1993) Lucky Beliefs Questionnaire 
Kugler and Jones (1992) Guilt Inventory 
Rheaurne et al. (1994) Responsibility Questionnaire 
Rheaurne et al. (1995) Perfectionism Questionnaire 
Shafran et al. (1996) Thought-Action Fusion Scale 
Sookman et al. (200 1) Vulnerability Schemata Scale 
Steketee et al. (1998) Obsessive Compulsive Beliefs Questionnaire 
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1.8.3 Inflated responsibility. 
Salkovskis' (1985,1989) theory of inflated responsibility was one of the 
first cognitive-behavioural approaches to OCD and has received the most 
attention in the cognitive literature on dysfunctional beliefs. The theory suggests 
that intrusive thoughts become clinical obsessions only when individuals 
appraise the intrusions as indicating they might be responsible for harm to 
themselves or others if they fail to take action (Fisher & Wells, 2005a). 
Checking, therefore, is invariably used to prevent their being held responsible for 
future catastrophes. Along with inflated responsibility beliefs, this theory also 
suggests that people with OCD believe that errors of omission are as bad as 
errors of commission, especially if one can foresee the possibility of harm 
(OCCWG, 1997). This often leads to the person engaging in a number of mental- 
control activities (e. g., attempts at gaining an accurate memory, taking account of 
all factors when making decisions, and preventing the occurrence of 
unacceptable material) (Salkovskis & Forrester, 2002). Ideas about personal 
responsibility have been found to be particularly strong predictors of checking 
behaviour (Artnz, Voncken, & Goosen, 2007). For example, perceived 
responsibility has been shown to directly predict anxiety levels as well as an 
individual's urge to check (Lopatka & Rachman, 1995). 
1.8.4 Thought-action fusion and the over-importance of 
thoughts. 
Some theories have discussed responsibility in terms of one's own 
thoughts and their consequences. In their theory on the over importance of 
thoughts, Freeston, Ladouceur, Gagnon, and Thibodeau ( 1993) argued that the 
mere presence of a thought appears to give it status. In a similar vein, Rachman 
(1993) suggested that a belief in 'thought-action fusion' (TAF) serves to inflate 
the importance of intrusive thoughts and is likely to motivate particular 
behavioural responses such as trying to control actions or thinking. This idea has 
two related components: 'Moral' TAF that reflects the belief that thoughts are 
morally equivalent to actions, and 'likelihood' TAF that reflects the belief that 
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thoughts can increase the probability of bad events actually occurring (Rachman, 
Thordarson, Shafran, & Woody, 1995). An individual with checking OCD may, 
therefore, believe that having a negative thought means that he/she has done 
something negative and may engage in mental or behavioural checking in an 
attempt to invalidate the intrusion (Wells, 1997). 
Some authors have expanded on this idea through the introduction of a 
meta-cognitive model of OCD. Clark and Purdon (1993), for example, suggest 
that beliefs about thoughts and thought processes in general can also lead to 
active resistance. They hypothesize that the following features are likely to 
characterise people with OCD: Excessive monitoring for the presence of mental 
intrusions; belief that these intrusions portend some catastrophe; belief that one is 
responsible for this harm because of the thoughts; and belief that one must 
control the thoughts to avoid harm and reduce distress. Wells and Matthews 
(1994) suggest that individuals with OCD have an inflated sense of responsibility 
through the beliefs they hold about the meaning and significance of intrusive 
thoughts. Metacognitive beliefs about intrusive thoughts are suggested to fall 
broadly into three domains: thought-action fusion (TAF; Rachman, 1993), 
thought-event fusion JEF; Wells, 1997) and thought-object fusion (TOF; Wells, 
2000). In an attempt to control thought occurrences, individuals are suggested to 
adopt specific attentional strategies that are likely to maintain OCD. For 
example, seeking a 'felt sense' or 'perfect memory' to indicate when to 
discontinue neutralizing (Fisher & Wells, 2005a). The Self-Regulatory Executive 
Function (S-REF) model (Wells & Matthews, 1994) has been used to 
demonstrate the information processing and self-regulation mechanisms involved 
in OCD. The S-REF consists of the activation of self-relevant beliefs, the 
appraisal of internal and external stimuli with respect to these beliefs, and the 
regulation of appraisal and behaviour intended to overcome any discrepancies 
between appraised actual and desired states of the self (Wells, 1997). Wells 
(2000) argues that obsessional clients have a tendency to assign priority to 
internally generated events rather than external events, therefore focusing 
excessive attention on fantasies concerning the consequences of not performing 
an action. The generic plan retrieved from self-knowledge is likely to specify 
control of the internal cognitive environment through maladaptive coping 
strategies such as suppression, avoidance, monitoring, and other attempts at mind 
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control such as continued rumination (Wells and Matthews, 1994). This then 
serves to maintain consciousness of the intruding thought through continued 
priming of factors associated with anxiety and the elaboration and reinforcement 
of self-knowledge through prevention of disconfirmation (Wells & Matthews, 
1994). 
1.8.5 Overestimation of threat, intolerance of uncertainty, 
perfectionism and control. 
Several writers have also proposed that people with OCD tend to 
overestimate the probability and cost of aversive events (e. g., Freeston, 
Rheaume, & Ladouceur, 1996; Salkovskis, 1985). For example, Foa and Kozak 
(1986) suggested that people with OCD have problems with epistemological 
reasoning and therefore view situations as dangerous until proven safe. Similarly, 
O'Connor and Robillard (1995,1999) outline an inference-based approach (IBA) 
to suggest that obsessions arise as a result of distorted inductive reasoning 
processes. This model suggests that whilst initially the person with OCD may 
perceive reality correctly, he/she is more susceptible to be influenced by self- 
generated narratives, which leads the person to doubt reality and infer a 
hypothetical state of affairs (Pelissier & O'Connor, 2002). O'Connor and 
Robillard (1995) have observed several reasoning errors that could contribute to 
the maintenance of OCD. These include inference processes such as category 
errors, drawing inferences from irrelevant memories, facts, and unrelated 
associations, and a dismissal of actual evidence and sense information in favor of 
basing action on a hypothetical reality. O'Connor and Robillard (1995) argue that 
such reasoning errors give rise to inferential confusion where a person confuses 
an imagined possibility with an actual probability based in the senses, and then 
acts 'as if' the imagined possibility is real. 
Perfection is another domain that has featured largely in the OCD 
literature. This domain is defined as the belief that there is a perfect solution to 
every problem, that it is necessary to do things without making mistakes, and that 
even minor mistakes will have serious consequences (Clark, 2002). Excessive 
concern over mistakes and the need for making things 'just right' are suggested 
to be linked to specific types of OCD symptoms such as checking (Gershunny & 
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Sher, 1995), cleaning (Tallis, 1996), and hoarding (Frost & Gross, 1993). 
'Intolerance of uncertainty' (Krohne, 1989) is suggested to be one factor that 
may influence both estimation of threat in OCD and perfectionist tendencies 
(Sookman, Pinard, & Beauchemin, 1994). It has long been observed that people 
with OCD have difficulty making decisions through appearing more cautious, 
requesting information to be repeated, and displaying greater doubt about the 
correctness of their decisions (OCCWG, 1997). These decision-making 
difficulties are thought to arise from an excessive need for certainty in order to 
control and predict events. However, because complete certainty over everyday 
events is extremely difficult to achieve, such individuals may feel uncertain 
about their capacity to reduce risk when there are no perfect solutions. 
Intolerance of uncertainty may therefore be linked to beliefs about threat 
estimation, perfectionism, and need for control (Sookman & Pinard, 2002). 
1.8.6 Critique of dysfunctional beliefs research in OCD. 
Despite there being empirical evidence for the different cognitive theories 
of OCD, research suggests a high degree of association and overlap across the six 
cognitive domains (Clark, 2002). Purdon and Clark (2002), for example, argue 
that certain types of control beliefs are the product of beliefs about responsibility 
or thought-action ftision beliefs. Perfectionism and intolerance of uncertainty are 
also suggested to be similar constructs (OCCWG, 2005). Salkovskis and 
Forrester (2002) suggest that an inflated sense of responsibility, the 
overimportance of thoughts and beliefs about the importance of controlling one's 
thoughts are so closely linked as to tap a single construct linked to the idea of 
causing harm. 
In addition, research suggests that most of the belief domains are not 
exclusive to people with obsessive compulsive problems. For example, 
intolerance of uncertainty and overestimation of threat are suggested to be 
vulnerability factors for anxiety disorders in general and are likely to contribute 
to the misinterpretation and negative appraisal of intrusions in important but less 
specific ways (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 1985). Some studies, however, have 
found cognitive characteristics unique to OCD. For example, Steketee, Frost, and 
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Cohen (1998) administered a self-report measure containing questions on 
different belief domains to a large sample of individuals with OCD, anxious 
controls, and non-clinical controls. Comparison of scores for each sample 
revealed that the Control, Responsibility, and Threat Estimation belief domains 
were considerably higher in individuals with OCD as opposed to general beliefs 
characteristic of anxiety. Salkovskis and Forrester (2002) also argue that the 
inflated responsibility domain is specific to OCD. 
Finally, it is argued that certain types of negative interpretations and 
beliefs associated with intrusive thoughts foster particular obsessive compulsive 
symptoms (OCCWG, 1997,2005; Rachman, 2002). For example, pathological 
doubt, or intolerance of uncertainty, is most clearly evident among clients with 
checking rituals (Rachman & Hodgson, 1980) whereas importance of thoughts 
may be more relevant for obsessions dealing with harm and aggression 
(Thordarson & Shafran, 2002). Emmelkamp and Aardema (1999) also found that 
thought-action fusion plays an important role in the washing and checking 
subscales of the Padua-R (Van Oppen et al., 1995), but not in the impulses, 
precision and rumination subscales. A recent study by Taylor et al. (2006) 
suggested that dysfunctional beliefs may not play an important role in all types of 
OCD. Their study identified two cognitive subtypes of OCD: OC-high, which 
was characterised by relatively high scores on measures of OC-related beliefs, 
and OC-low, which generally did not differ from controls on measures of beliefs. 
It was argued that such findings may eventually yield important implications for 
developing subtype specific treatments for OCD. 
1.9 Cognitive Treatmentsfor OCD 
1.9.1 Cognitive Therapy. 
Cognitive Therapy (CT) for OCD was developed to target distorted 
cognitions conceptualized as potential maintaining factors that remain 
unaddressed with behavioral treatment and to provide a less anxiety-provoking 
alternative to ERP, which would hopefully result in lower drop out rates 
(Whittal, Thordarson, & McLean, 2005). The strategies used are based on 
methods derived from Beck's cognitive therapy (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 
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1985) and focus on the modification of beliefs and appraisals. General strategies 
used in CT for OCD include enabling the client to see intrusions as stimuli, 
identifying and challenging negative automatic thoughts that immediately follow 
the intrusions, and to look for the underlying dysfunctional schemas and modify 
these (Bouvard, 2002). 
An important general cognitive technique used by the therapist to 
challenge automatic thoughts is Socratic Dialogue (Beck, 1976). That is, the 
client is encouraged to question the catastrophic significance of the intrusive 
thought and construct alternative less catastrophic interpretations (Bouvard, 
2002). Several case reports and papers have also described specific techniques to 
help modify obsessions in OCD by reducing the degree to which clients view 
them as significant and important (e. g., Salkovskis & Warwick, 1985; Steketee, 
1993; Van Oppen & Arntz, 1994; Whittal & McLean, 2000). Freeston et al. 
(1996) offer cognitive techniques for clients who describe obsessions without 
compulsive behaviour, including tape-loop exposure and response prevention, 
cognitive restructuring using standard techniques such as Socratic Questioning, 
and identification of negative automatic thoughts, behavioural experiments, and 
relapse prevention. 
1.9.2 Meta-cognitive techniques. 
Recent theories of OCD have influenced the selection of treatment 
strategies and led to criticisms of more traditional techniques. Wells (1997), for 
example, argues that modification of declarative beliefs alone may only be 
partially effective if the individuals processing routine continues to generate 
patterns of attention and appraisals that generate dysfunctional knowledge. 
Socratic Dialogue may therefore not be the most useful way to modify beliefs as 
it may serve to activate dysftinctional processes (Wells, 1997). Wells (1999) 
argues that in order to generate and effect changes in procedures it is necessary 
for the client to acquire new skills of processing that require repeated practice of 
new processing routines. The use of 'meta-cognitive profiling' techniques (Wells 
& Matthews, 1994) is suggested to identify dysfunctional beliefs and map 
attentional, memory, and ideational processes. 'Decentering' (Teasdale, 1999), or 
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the ability to view thoughts as mental events in a wider context of awareness 
rather than as expressions of reality, is also seen as central to therapy (Wells & 
Matthews, 1994). As a result, new cognitive techniques include 'detached 
mindfulness' (Wells & Matthews, 1994) in which clients are instructed to 
disengage ruminative appraisal from intrusive thoughts. 
1.9.3 Cognitive Behavioural Therapy. 
CBT for OCD combines Cognitive Therapy (CT) with Exposure and 
Response Prevention (ERP) exercises. These exercises are framed as behavioural 
experiments to test appraisals and beliefs (Taylor, 2002). The obsession is 
deliberately provoked and the client is instructed to maintain concentrated 
attention on the unwanted thought and its associated interpretation, while at the 
same time preventing a compulsive or neutralization response (Clark, 2005). In 
addition to ERP, more standard cognitive restructuring is used to directly modify 
faulty appraisals and obsession-related beliefs. 
Similar techniques are used in more recent CBT treatments. For example, 
Wells' (1997,2000) metacognitive model of OCD suggests that treatment 
requires the modification of thought-fusion beliefs by incorporating brief 
exposure and response prevention experiments (ERP-E). These behavioural 
experiments consist of five minute exposure to obsessional stimuli designed to 
explicitly test the veracity of metacognitive beliefs. Response prevention then 
helps the client to attribute the non-occurrence of imagined catastrophe to the 
falseness of the metacognitive belief rather than to the performance of the ritual 
(Fisher & Wells, 2005a). This technique is argued to be markedly different to 
traditional ERP as it helps shift clients to metacognitive processing of the validity 
of beliefs about intrusions. 
1.9.4 Efficacy of current treatments. 
Despite overwhelming evidence highlighting the significant role played 
by cognitive mechanisms in OCD, there is little evidence to suggest that the 
cognitive components of CBT add to the effectiveness of traditional Behaviour 
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Therapy (Steketee, Frost & Wilson, 2002). Emmelkamp, Visser, and Hoekstra 
(1988) compared CT with exposure in vivo and response prevention over a 
period of ten sessions. They found that the results of CT were about equally 
effective as self-controlled exposure in vivo. Both treatments led to a reduction 
in symptoms and CT led to significant improvements in depressed mood 
(Emmelkamp, Van Oppen, & Van Balkom, 2002). A meta-analysis of studies 
that directly compared CBT and ERP also concluded that exposure procedures 
used alone is as effective as CBT (Abramowitz, 1997). McLean et al. (2001) 
compared group ERP with group CBT and found that the ERP group had 
significantly lower scores on an OCD inventory than the CBT group. In addition, 
at 3-month follow-up a significantly higher percentage of ERP treatment 
completers (44%) reached recovered status compared to CBT completers (13%). 
However, McLean et al. (200 1) suggest that the results may have been because 
ERP was easily adapted to be delivered in a group format whereas the 
idiosyncratic nature of the appraisals in OCD would likely favour individual 
CBT over group CBT. Finally, Fisher and Wells (2005a) found that when 
standardized Jacobson methodology (Jacobson & Truax, 1991) was applied to 
studies to define clinically significant change, ERP appeared the most effective 
treatment currently available. 
A recent paper by Whittal et al. (2005) suggests that CBT produces an 
equivalent rate of reffisal, drop-outs, homework non-compliance and treatment 
non-response as does ERP. It could be argued, therefore, that currently there is 
no systematic empirical evidence that CBT might be more effective in treating 
obsessional clients who refuse ERP (Clark, 2005). The findings of outcome 
studies are argued by some to be a result of basing treatment on early cognitive 
therapy techniques and not targeting the appraisals suggested by current 
cognitive theories (Wells, 2000; Whittal et al. 2005). Old techniques such as 
thought-stopping and distraction and dismissal procedures are now argued to be 
potentially counter therapeutic for clients with OCD, either by virtue of 
becoming 'neutralising' in themselves, or by interfering with functional exposure 
(Salkovskis, 1985). 
Recently, it has been suggested that specialized cognitive and behavioral 
treatment procedures that target specific characteristics of OCD subtypes appear 
to improve outcome (McKay et al., 2004). Subtype-specific protocols would 
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incorporate specific procedures into the treatment protocol depending on the 
presence of various cognitive and behavioral symptoms (Wilhelm & Steketee, 
2002). Although research is currently ongoing in this area, initial outcome 
evaluations of such an approach have been very positive (Wilhelm, Steketee, 
Fama, & Golan, 2003). The current study will attempt to add to this work by 
examining two cognitive processes that may be important in the checking 
subtype. 
1.9.5 Current treatment guidelines. 
Despite the lack of evidence to suggest that CBT is superior to ERP, the 
National Institute of Clinical Excellence (NICE, 2006) recently recognised CBT 
as the treatment of choice for individuals with OCD. The following guidelines 
have been recently published: 
"In the initial treatment of adults with OCD, low intensity psychological 
treatments (including ERP) (up to 10 therapist hours per patient) should 
be offered if the patient's degree offunctional impairment is mild andlor 
the patient expresses a preferencefor a low intensity approach. Low 
intensity treatments include: 
Brief individual CB T (including ERP) using structured self-help 
materials. 
Brief individual CBT (including ERP) by telephone. 
Group CB T (including ERP). 
Adults with OCD with moderatefunctional impairment should be offered 
the choice of either a course of an SSRI or more intensive CBT (including 
ERP) (more than 10 therapist hours per patient), because these 
treatments appear to be comparably efficacious. Adults with OCD with 
severe functional impairment should be offered combined treatment with 
an SSRI and CBT (including ERP) ". 
(NICE, 2006, pp. 231-232). 
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Despite this positive move towards psychological therapy as an effective 
treatment of OCD, NICE still recommend that further work is necessary to 
determine the optimal interventions for those people who do not initially respond 
to CBT (NICE, 2006). 
1.10 Ps chological Theories of Checking Compulsions y 
1.10.1 Introduction. 
In recent years, the limitations of general cognitive theories to explain 
specific symptoms of OCD have been highlighted. For example, Van den Hout 
and Kindt (2003b) argue that whilst cognitive theory explains the occurrence of 
checking urges, it does not readily explain the persistence of doubt after 
checking. In addition, some studies have found that particular types of 
dysfunctional beliefs are more prominent in some subtypes of OCD compared to 
others. For example, Tolin, Abramowitz, Brigidi, and Foa (2003) found that 
obsessive compulsive checkers showed greater intolerance of uncertainty than 
obsessive compulsive non-checkers and anxious controls. Also, the hypothesis 
that OCD clients in general would evidence greater intolerance of uncertainty 
compared to anxious controls was not supported suggesting that some cognitive 
models may only apply to a particular subgroup of OCD. As a result, cognitive 
theories have begun to look more specifically at different subtypes of OCD, with 
a particular focus on checking compulsions. 
1.10.2 Models of memory deficits. 
Historically, neuropsychiatric models of checking compulsions looked at 
the possibility of memory deficits that could trigger doubt and motivate 
individuals to repeatedly check an action (Tallis, Pratt, & Jamani, 1999). Results 
supporting a deficit in episodic memory however have been weak and 
inconsistent. For example, Deckersbach, Otto, Savage, Baer, and Jenike (2000) 
found that OCD clients were impaired in both immediate and delayed free recall 
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but had preserved verbal memory recognition concluding that the deficits did not 
appear to be pervasive. On the other hand, MacDonald, Antony, MacLeod, and 
Richter (1997) investigated recall and recognition memory among OCD checkers 
and found no statistical differences between OCD checkers, OCD non-checkers 
and controls. Several other studies have also failed to find evidence of any 
memory deficits (e. g., Foa, Amir, Gershuny, Molnar, & Kozak, 1997; Rachman 
& Shafran, 1998). Some research has focused specifically on deficits in memory 
for 'actions' and found that OCD checkers exhibit deficits in recalling and 
recognizing self-performed actions (Rubenstein, Peynirdoglu, Chambless, & 
Pigott, 1993; Ecker & Engelkamp, 1995). It may be, therefore, that OCD 
checkers are impaired in recall of human actions, particularly their own actions, 
but not necessarily in more general information (Muller & Roberts, 2005). 
However, it is unclear whether this form of memory impairment is specifically 
correlated with checking behaviours versus OCD in general and whether it is an 
actual memory deficit or an overly critical attitude towards memory functioning 
that prompts checking behaviour (Muller & Roberts, 2005). 
In addition to the inconsistent findings of memory research, critiques also 
focus on the ability of an individual with checking OCD to comfortably carry out 
neutral mental tasks at work and at home, even when these tasks call on 
considerable memorial resources (Rachman, 2002). Instead, the memory 
difficulties appear to be specific, and even disappear when responsibility is 
removed, reduced or transferred (Radomsky & Rachman, 1999; Radomsky, 
Rachman, & Hammond, 2001). Finally, use of neuropsychological tests to assess 
general memory deficits in OCD have produced discrepant results and suggest 
that any observed memory deficits may be driven by difficulties organizing 
information (Coles, Radomsky, & Homg, 2006). 
1.10.3 Alternative cognitive explanations. 
Owing to the lack of evidence in memory research, some studies have 
attempted to seek alternative explanations for repeated checking behaviours. 
Tuna, Tekcan, and Topcuoglu (2005), for example, argue that individuals who 
repeatedly check do so through a lack of confidence in their memory 
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performance. This lack of confidence leads to a 'meta-memory' problem that 
causes them to doubt their actions and repeatedly check. Consistent with this, 
Tolin et al. (200 1) found that clients with OCD whose primary symptom was 
checking were less confident in their long-term memory performance than OCD 
individuals without checking symptoms. In a meta-analysis of impairment and 
confidence in explicit memory, Woods, Vevea, Chambless, and Bayen (2002) 
also found the highest effect size was for memory confidence. That said, 
compulsive checking is not generally observed in individuals with major 
depression, traumatic brain injury, or the normal aging process, all of which 
might also be characterised by poor memory confidence (Tolin et al., 2003). 
Other research has focused on particular types of dysfunctional beliefs 
introduced in more general cognitive models of OCD. For example, studies have 
found that individuals with checking compulsions are more likely to show an 
intolerance of uncertainty and therefore desire more vivid memories. Constans, 
Foa, Franklin, and Matthews (1995), for example, found that despite no 
difference in reported memory vividness, compulsive checkers stated that they 
desired more vivid memories than did non-anxious controls. Julian, O'Connor, 
Aardema, and Todorov (2006) investigated specificity of belief domains in OCD 
subtypes and found that perfectionism/certainty predicted checking compulsions. 
Wells and Matthews' (1994) draw on their self-regulatory executive 
function (S-REF) model in an attempt to explain repeated checking behaviours, 
through information processing biases and self-regulation. Rather than 
suggesting a direct failure of encoding or retrieval, Wells and Matthews (1994) 
argue that repeated checking may be due to a meta-cognitive failure in 
distinguishing fantasy from reality. They argue that as checkers are particularly 
prone to question their memory for actions, and imagine negative consequences 
in situations, they are more likely to be characterised by a heightened self- 
consciousness that attends to negative fantasies (Wells, 1997). This failure to 
engage in 'reality monitoring' may mean the person confuses the memory of the 
fantasy of action failure with the memory of actually performing the action, 
which is sufficient to stimulate further checking in an attempt to reduce the 
associated anxiety (Wells & Matthews, 1994). Wells (1997) argues that strategies 
of detached mindftilness and techniques for reducing heightened cognitive self- 
consciousness should prove helpful as additions to treatment. 
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1.10.4 Recent experimental research. 
Recently, experimental work has extended research into pathological 
doubt and memory by examining the impact of repeated checking on memory 
accuracy and confidence. Van den Hout and Kindt (2003a, 2003b, 2004) attempt 
to explain why individuals are compelled to repeatedly check an action through 
the use of Tulvings (1985) 'remember/know' distinction. That is, the belief that 
an action has taken place may stem from either remembering physical details of 
the event or from knowing that something happened because it is part of a 
general rule. Van den Hout and Kindt (2003a) apply this to repeated checking 
behaviours by suggesting that increased familiarity of an action/event results in a 
less vivid and detailed recollection owing to the individual simply 'knowing' an 
event occurred rather than actually 'remembering' doing it. The more an OCD 
client checks, therefore, the more familiar the checking gets, which results in a 
less vivid and detailed recollection and, hence, a reduction in the confidence of 
that memory. Through a series of experiments using virtual computerised stoves, 
the authors supported this hypothesis by showing first that non-clinical 
individuals who engaged in relevant repeated checking showed marked decreases 
in memory confidence, vividness and detail and secondly, that repeated checking 
led to a shift from 'remembering' the most recent check at pre-test to simply 
'knowing' that they had checked the relevant item at post-test (Van den Hout & 
Kindt, 2003a, 2003b). 
It appears therefore that rather than checking compulsions being the result 
of memory impairment, repeatedly checking can cause memory impairment by 
making recollection less vivid and detailed (Muller & Roberts, 2005). Further 
work replicating and expanding on these ideas has been conducted. For example, 
Radomsky et al. (2006) expanded on earlier experiments by using a real kitchen 
stove (relevant checking) or a real kitchen faucet (irrelevant checking). 
Consistent with Van den Hout and Kindt (2003a, 2003b), results demonstrated 
that repeated checking led to a significant decline in memory confidence, 
vividness and detail. Further, repeated checking under ecologically valid 
conditions produced small but significant declines in memory accuracy. Cole et 
al. (2006) designed an experiment to further delineate the impact of repeated 
checking on memory and metamemory. Not only did the results replicate those 
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of Radomsky et al. (2006), it was discovered that the greatest changes in memory 
confidence, vividness, and detail might occur between 2 and 10 checks. Finally, 
Boschen & Vuksanovic (in press) extended previous findings by using a clinical 
sample of individuals with OCD. They found that the deterioration of memory 
confidence seen in individuals with OCD was broadly equivalent to that seen in 
student controls, until, that is, a condition of perceived responsibility was added. 
When perceived responsibility for a mild shock to another person was added, 
individuals with OCD showed a significant further deterioration in memory 
confidence compared with students. 
1.10.5 A cognitive model of checking compulsions. 
Given the dominance of checking in OCD, Rachman (2002) recently 
proposed a detailed theoretical formulation of repeated checking that adds to 
Salkovskis (1985) original work on OCD by incorporating ideas taken from 
recent research. According to this theory, compulsive checking occurs when 
people who have an inflated responsibility for preventing harm feel unsure that a 
perceived threat has been adequately reduced or removed. In their attempts to 
achieve certainty about the absence or the unlikelihood of harm occurring, the 
individual repeatedly checks for safety. Paradoxically, these attempts to check 
for safety can produce adverse affects that turn the checking behaviour into a 
self-perpetuating mechanism. Rachman (2002) proposes that checking is 
maintained by four main factors: 1) an unsuccessful search for certainty, 2) 
decreases in memory confidence with repeated checking, 3) elevations in the 
predicted likelihood of harm when one feels personally responsible, and 4) 
increases in perceived responsibility with repeated checking. 
Based on this theory, Rachman (2002) proposes that it is the response 
prevention component of behaviour therapy, and not the exposure, which has an 
impact on the individuals' difficulties. That is, if repeated checking results in a 
self-perpetuating mechanism by increasing levels of personal responsibility and 
decreasing memory confidence, exposure is unlikely to have a direct impact on 
the factors that maintain the checking behaviours. Response prevention, 
however, may help the client to re-assess the perceived probability of danger and 
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responsibility. Addressing the primary cognitive elements in compulsive 
checking, namely the belief that one has a special elevated responsibility for 
protecting others/self from harm, would therefore be of central importance. 
Rachman (2002) summarises this by suggesting three main components of 
treatment: a) reduction of the core belief of inflated responsibility; b) 
modification of the maladaptive cognitive misinterpretations of one's out-of- 
control behaviour and the impaired confidence in one's memory; and c) use of 
response prevention tactics. Rachman argues that each component deals with a 
specific aspect of compulsive checking. For example, changing misappraisals 
will have the greatest affect on anxiety whilst response prevention will reduce 
responsibility and recurrency, and lower the estimates of harm. It is therefore 
essential that all four components of treatment be addressed in order to produce 
dependable and significant reductions in compulsive checking behaviour 
(Rachman, 2002). 
LH Current study 
1.11.1 Rationale and aims. 
Despite a vast amount of literature in this area, the current review 
suggests that there is still a gap in our knowledge and understanding of OCD and 
its effective treatment. Although recommended in the recent NICE guidelines, 
there is still little or no evidence that cognitive components of treatment add to 
the effectiveness of traditional Behaviour Therapy (Steketee et al., 2002). 
Because of a theoretical move towards looking at subtypes of OCD, research into 
the different types of dysfunctional beliefs and cognitive processes involved in 
the maintenance of OCD has become more specific. Despite this, clinical trial 
research still tends to follow a more traditional and generalized CBT approach. It 
is possible that this lack of specificity may be affecting the efficacy of treatments 
for OCD. 
Recent theories of checking compulsions suggest that checking 
behaviours themselves could become a self-perpetuating mechanism that 
maintains the difficulty (Rachman, 2002; Van den Hout & Kindt, 2003a, 2003b). 
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Research to date concentrates on behavioural compulsions where individuals 
physically repeat a checking action to reduce anxiety (e. g., Van den Hout & 
Kindt, 2003a, 2003b; Radomsky et al., 2006). However, as a desire for certainty 
is more likely in individuals with checking behaviours (Constans et al., 1995), it 
is highly likely that such individuals will also engage in cognitive strategies in an 
effort to obtain certainty and reduce their anxiety. Within a cognitive-behavioural. 
framework, these cognitive strategies are seen as 'safety behaviours'. That is, 
behaviours that an individual uses in an attempt to decrease anxiety or perceived 
feared catastrophe (Salkovskis, 1991). However, these safety behaviours often 
have a paradoxical effect in that they prevent disconfirmation of unrealistic 
beliefs and instead may serve to increase anxiety (Wells et al., 1995). The use of 
safety behaviours may be limiting the effectiveness of traditional exposure 
treatments. For example, a recent study by Salkovskis, Hackmann, Wells, 
Gelder, and Clark (2007) found that exposure that included the drop or reversal 
of safety seeking behaviours was more effective for individuals with panic 
disorder than exposure based solely on habituation. This suggests that the 
manipulation of key safety behaviours as an adjunct to ERP could provide a 
more effective treatment. The same effect could potentially occur in individuals 
with OCD (checking subtype). That is, the manipulation of key cognitive 
strategies used by individuals with OCD (checking subtype) during and after 
exposure may help to reduce the anxiety and urge to go back and check. With 
further research, therefore, CBT techniques could effectively move on to 
targeting specific cognitive safety behaviours that are having this maladaptive 
effect in people who repeatedly check, as well as addressing underlying beliefs 
which should improve the efficacy of treatments. 
When conducting research of this kind, some authors have argued that 
carefully controlled outcome investigations may not generalise to the 
circumstances that characterise actual clinical practice (Borkovec & Castonguay, 
2006). In addition, conclusions regarding a statistically significant difference 
found between treatment and control conditions are limited to the therapy as a 
whole rather than the identification of effective components of treatment 
(Borkovec & Castonguay, 2006). Instead, it is argued that methods should 
involve dismantling and additive designs in order to identify case-and-effect 
relationships (Behar & Borkovec, 2003). Controlled experimental designs are 
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suggested to be crucial for the specification of causes and subsequent 
contribution to the improvement of treatment (Borkovec & Castonguay, 2006). 
This study will therefore use a single-case series experimental design to focus on 
the potentially maladaptive use of two cognitive safety behaviours commonly 
used by individuals with checking compulsions. 
1.11.2 Hypotheses 
1.11.2.1 Experiment 1: Memory searching. 
An intolerance of uncertainty is thought to be prominent in individuals 
who engage in checking behaviours. Searching for a perfect memory in an effort 
to reduce this uncertainty may therefore be counterproductive for these 
individuals (Rachman, 2002). For example, because the person is unlikely to 
hold a perfect memory of a habitual action, engaging in a memory search will 
serve to highlight this uncertainty and therefore have a paradoxical effect of 
increasing anxiety, urge to check, and negative belief. Conversely, engaging in a 
task that enables an individual to retain the image in mind but prevents them 
from checking their memory is likely to have a reverse effect. 
Hypothesis 1: Asking a participant with OCD (checking subtype) to engage in a 
memory search immediately after checking will lead to a decrease in memory 
detail and confidence compared to a condition in which the participant does not 
search their memory. 
Hypothesis 2: Asking a participant with OCD (checking subtype) to engage in a 
memory search immediately after checking will lead to an increase in anxiety 
and urge to check compared to a condition in which the participant does not 
search their memory. 
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1.11.2.2 Experiment 2: Reasoning. 
Reasoning with oneself is often used as a strategy to reduce uncertainty in 
people with OCD (Aardema & O'Connor, 2003). However, because intolerance 
of uncertainty is a key feature of OCD, reasoning with oneself may actually serve 
to confirm the feared beliefs (i. e. that the risk is not zero). That is, if the goal of 
reasoning with oneself is to reduce uncertainty to zero, then this reasoning will 
maintain awareness of the discrepancy between the desired and actual state, so 
will serve to maintain or increase anxiety. On the other hand, an exercise 
designed to weaken the association between uncertainty and anxiety may serve to 
'decatastrophize' uncertainty and increase an individual's self-efficacy to tolerate 
the feeling of uncertainty (Tolin et al., 2003). 
Hypothesis 3: Asking a participant with OCD (checking subtype) to reason with 
themselves about the likelihood that an item was not checked properly 
immediately after checking will lead to a decrease in memory detail and 
confidence compared to a condition in which the participant is encouraged to 
accept uncertainty. 
Hypothesis 4: Asking a participant with OCD (checking subtype) to reason with 
themselves about the likelihood that an item was not checked properly 
immediately after checking will lead to an increase in anxiety and urge to check 





A single-case experiment can be defined as "a designed experiment in 
which one entity is observed repeatedly during a certain period under different 
levels ("treatments") of at least one independent variable" (Onghena & 
Edgington, 2005, p. 57). It differs from the case study in that it seeks to 
systematically rule out alternative explanations of a result through the use of 
within-subject randomisation and repeated measurement, thus reducing threats to 
internal validity by controlling for potential confounding variables (Malott & 
Trojan Suarez, 2004). Single-case series experimental designs are ideal for 
applied settings where Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs) may be prohibitive 
due to lack of a sufficient sample size or a low incidence of the presenting 
problem (Hayes, Barlow, & Nelson-Gray, 1999). An advantage of this method is 
that it enables the researcher to 'mimic' a component of treatment in a 
naturalistic way which is of great importance to the current study where the 
primary objectives include refining and improving treatments for OCD. 
For the current study, an ABC single-case series experimental design 
(Barlow & Hersen, 1984) was used with B and C conditions counterbalanced 
across participants. Condition A in the study acted as a baseline and conditions B 
and C allowed for the manipulation of key safety behaviours. The inclusion of a 
baseline is common in studies that look at the manipulation of safety behaviours 
(e. g., Wells et al., 1995; Salkovskis, Clark, Hackmann, Wells, & Gelder, 1999). 
It allows for a measure of outcome through the calculation of a change score and 
provides information on levels of anxiety and what the participant usually does in 
a naturalistic setting. The ABC design allows for a controlled focus on specific 
cause-and-effect relationships within therapy and is thus suitable for meeting the 
aims and objectives of the research. In addition, the replication of the experiment 
increases the external validity of findings across clients. A between-group design 
may also have established cause-and-effect relationships sufficiently; however, 
the sample size needed for such a design is considerably larger (Barlow & 
Hersen, 1984). In addition, a counterbalanced cross-over design enables each 
participant to receive every experimental condition, which has the advantage of 
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controlling for variability in the sample across conditions that is more likely to 
arise with between-group designs (Fisher & Wells, 2005b). In the current study, 
it was important to control for possible order effects. That is, the possibility that 
condition C works only because it follows on from condition B or that is it 
presented at a certain time during the session. Order effects such as these were 
controlled for by counterbalancing the sequence of tasks in both experiments. 
Half of the participants were randomly assigned to receive condition B before C; 
the other participants received condition C then B. Details of how participants 
were randomized to each condition are provided in the procedure section. 
22 Participants 
Potential participants were selected from outpatient clinical psychology 
referrals to adult (18-65 year olds) clinical psychology services in Leeds and 
Wakefield. Referrals to these services are accepted from a variety of sources 
including GP's, Psychiatrists or any other member of a multi-disciplinary team. 
Waiting lists varied in length between departments and some services operated a 
pre-assessment and post-assessment waiting list. Where this was the case, both 
waiting lists were used to select potential participants. Through liaison with the 
service manager, a clinician working at each service was asked to examine the 
waiting list. In order to maximize the potential of selecting suitable clients for the 
study, clinicians were asked to use a set of inclusion/exclusion criteria when 
looking through the waiting list. That is, they were asked to search for key words 
such as 'obsessions', 'compulsions', 'rituals', and 'checking' in the referral letter 
as well as selecting people already with a diagnosis of OCD (checking subtype). 
Once potential participants had been identified, an information pack was 
sent out to each person by the secretaries at each site. The information pack (see 
appendix A& B) included a letter inviting the potential participant to take part in 
the study (with a response sheet attached), a participant information sheet, and a 
stamped addressed envelope for potential participants to return their response slip 
to the researcher. All documents sent out in the information pack had been 
approved by York Research Ethics Committee and undergone Site Specific 
Assessments. Potential participants were asked to fill in their name and contact 
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details on the response slip if they were interested in finding out more about the 
study. 
2.3 Inclusion and exclusion criteria 
During the assessment session, potential participants were invited to take 
part in the study if he/she met the following inclusion and exclusion criteria: 
Inclusion: 
" Not currently receiving psychological treatment 
" Not received Cognitive Behaviour Therapy in the past two years 
" Aged between 18 and 65 years 
" Meets diagnostic criteria for OCD as assessed by the MINI (Sheehan 
et at., 1998) 
* OCD is the main presenting problem 
9 Participant reports checking symptoms to be the primary presenting 
symptom 
To establish whether participants meet the above inclusion criteria, a 
clinical interview and semi-structured interview was used in the assessment 
session. Open-ended questions were used to identify the type of treatment 
participants had previously received. Similarly, the researcher identified the 
primary presenting problems through asking the participant what problem 
behaviours they were hoping to focus on in treatment. Descriptive measures used 
in the assessment session provided further detail on the frequency and severity of 
checking behaviours in relation to the participant's difficulties. In no cases was 
there any discrepancy between the researcher's clinical judgment of the primary 
presenting problem and the results of the descriptive measures. 
Exclusion: 
The assessment reveals a suicide or self-harm risk 
Alcohol or drug dependence 
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Co-morbidity was not classed as an exclusion criterion providing that the 
OCD was seen by the participant and researcher as the main presenting problem. 
Level of suicide and self-harm risk was established through the use of the MINI 
(Sheehan et al., 1998, see page 41) and the BDI-11 (Beck et al., 1996, see page 
4 1). Similarly, alcohol and drug dependence was measured by the MINI 
(Sheehan et al., 1998). 
Z4 Description of the sample 
Twenty-seven people were identified from the waiting list over a six 
month period. Out of 27 letters sent, nine people (33%) expressed an interest in 
the study. Of these, seven people met criteria at the assessment interview and 
five people went on to complete the study. Two participants dropped out of the 
study following the assessment interview. One of these participants became 
anxious at the thought of taking part in the exposure tasks. The other participant 
was spoken to rudely by a member of staff at the department at which he was 
assessed and subsequently withdrew his consent. The demographic 
characteristics of the participants are presented in table 2. Because of ethical 
guidelines, the researcher was unable to obtain demographic information about 
participants who did not complete the study. 
Table 2. Descriptive information on the sample 
Participant Age Gender Comorbid axis I Medication Previous 
diagnosis treatment 
1 27 Female Agoraphobia Paroxetine Counselling 
40mg 
2 41 Female None None CB 
3 50 Female None None None 
4 29 Female Past depressive Sertraline None 
episod , agoraphobia 100mg 





2.5.1 Descriptive measures. 
MINI International Neuropsychiatric Interview (MINI; Sheehan et al., 
1998) 
The MINI is a short diagnostic structured interview that screens 17 Axis I 
DSM-III-R disorders for 24 current and lifetime diagnoses. It was developed to 
meet the need for a brief reliable and valid structured diagnostic interview that 
could replace existing diagnostic tools such as the Structured Clinical Interview 
for DSM-IV Axis I disorders (SCID-I). The MINI is fully structured to allow 
administration by non-specialized interviewers (Lecrubier et al., 1997). It shows 
good agreement with the SCID-I and the Composite International Diagnostic 
Interview (CIDI) (Pinninti et al., 2003; Sheehan et al., 1998). It also shows good 
inter-rater and test-retest reliability (Lecrubier et al., 1997). 
Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck & Steer, 1993) 
The BAI is a21 -item self-report measure that assesses anxiety symptoms 
in adults and adolescents. Each item is rated with reference to the last week. 
Items are rated on a 4-point scale with the following correspondence: "Not at all" 
(0 points); "mildly; it did not bother me that much" (1); "Moderately; it was 
unpleasant, but I could stand it" (2); and "severely; I could barely stand it" (3). 
The BAI total score is the sum of the ratings for the 21 items, with a maximum 
score of 63. Total scores of 0 to 7 reflect minimal levels of anxiety; scores of 8 to 
15 indicate mild anxiety; scores of 16 to 25 reflect moderate anxiety; and scores 
of 26 to 63 indicate severe anxiety. The BAI demonstrates high convergent 
validity (Steer & Beck, 1997) and internal consistency (Harari, Waehler, & 
Rogers, 2005). 
Beck Depression Inventory - Second edition (BDI-11; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 
1996) 
The BDI-11 is a21 -item self-report measure that assesses the level of 
depressive symptomatology in adults and adolescents aged 13 years or older. 
Each item is rated in relation to the past two weeks and is scored on a scale 
ranging from 0 (no symptomatology) to 3 (severe symptoms). Total scores of 0 to 
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13 reflect minimal level ofdepression; scores of 14 to 19 indicate mild 
depression; scores of 20 to 28 reflect moderate depression; and scores of 29 to 
63 indicate severe depression. Respondents have to score above 13, therefore, to 
fall within the clinical range. The first edition of the BDI became one of the most 
widely accepted instruments for assessing the severity of depression in diagnosed 
patients and for detecting possible depression in normal populations (Archer, 
Maruish, Imhof, & Piotrowski, 1991). The revised BDI-11 demonstrates high test- 
retest reliability and good internal consistency (Beck, Steer, Ball, & Ranieri, 
1996). 
Clark-Beck Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (CBOCI, Clark & Beck, 2002) 
The CBOCI is a 25-itern self-report screening measure for OCD. it is 
designed to be efficient, comprehensive and precise and can be completed in 10- 
20 minutes. The CBOCI is patterned after the BDI-II, with a similar response 
format and structure. Each item is rated on a 4-point scale from 0 to 3. A 
response of 0 indicates absence of the symptom within the past two weeks. A 
response of 3 indicates the highest frequency/difficulty with the symptom. The 
obsessions subscale score is based on the summation of the first 14 items with a 
maximum score of 42. The Compulsions subscale score is based on the 
summation of the last II items with a maximum score of 33. The two subscales 
are added together to give a total score. Total scores of 0 to 20 reflect 
minimallnonclinical symptoms; scores of 21 to 52 indicate mild to moderate 
clinical symptoms; and scores of 53 to 73 indicate severe clinical symptoms. To 
fall within the clinical range, therefore, respondents have to score nine or above 
on each subscale and have a total score of 20 or above. The CBOCI has 
demonstrated good convergent and discriminant validity (Clark, Beck, Antony, 
& Swinson, 2005). 
Maudsley Obsessional-Compulsive Inventory (MOCI; Hodgson & 
Rachman, 1977). 
The MOCI is a 30-item true/false self-report questionnaire that assesses 
overt rituals and their related obsessions. A total score as well as washing (I I 
items), checking (9 items), slowness (7 items) and doubting (7 items) subscale 
scores may be determined. Although there is no universal cut-off score for the 
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MOCI, a recommended clinical cut-off score on the checking sub-scale is 5 
(Gershunny & Sher, 1995). The sub-scales have been found to have adequate 
internal consistency and test-retest reliability (Hodgson & Rachman, 1977). The 
MOCI also shows moderate agreement with the Yale-Brown Obsessive 
Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS) and the Leyton Obsessional Inventory (LOI) and 
has good predictive validity when measured against the Anxiety Disorders 
Interview Schedule (ADIS) (Steinberger & Bums, 1990). Despite the 
development of numerous alternative measures of OCD severity over the last two 
decades, the MOCI probably remains the most widely used instrument for 
assessing general OCD symptornatology (Einstein & Menzies, 2004). 
Obsessional-Beliefs Questionnaire (OBQ-44; OCCWG, 2005) 
The OBQ-44 consists of 44 belief statements developed to characterize 
obsessive thinking (OCCWG, 2005). The OBQ-44 has three factor analytically 
determined subscales: (a) inflated personal responsibility and the tendency to 
overestimate threat (Responsibility/Threat), (b) perfectionism and intolerance of 
uncertainty (Perfectionism/Certainty), and (c) over-importance and over-control 
of thoughts (Importance/Control). Respondents rate their level of agreement with 
items on a 7-point rating scale, with I being disagree very much and 7 being 
agree very much. Higher scores therefore indicate a greater strength of beliefs. 
The OBQ-44 demonstrates good test-retest reliability, convergent validity, and 
discriminant validity (OCCWG, 2001,2003,2005). 
Weekly Obsession and Compulsion Index - adapted (WOCI; Single Case 
Research and Practice Group, unpublished) 
The WOO (see appendix C) was designed by the Single Case Research 
and Practice Group (SCRAP) in Leeds as a brief, weekly rating scale of 
obsessive and compulsive symptoms. It was also designed to provide ratings of 
the type of cognitions typically seen in OCD. The WOCI consists of four 
questions about symptoms and behaviours during the last week rated on a0 (not 
at all) to 8 (extremely distressing) scale: 
How distressing have youfoundyour intrusive thoughts? 
How strong has the urge been to carry out your rituals? 
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How many times have you carried out your rituals? 
How much have the intrusive thoughts interfered with your life (e. g., family 
relationships, work, social lifie)? 
A simple 0- 100 belief rating scale is also included to rate how much the 
participant believes in each of the listed thoughts, with 0 being do not believe the 
thought at all and 100 being completely convinced the thought is true: 
I must do everything Ipossibly can to stop harm from occurring. 
It is important to have certainty in life. 
I should be able to control my thoughts. 
Bad thoughts can make bad things happen. 
Thinking a bad thought makes me a badperson. 
I must do things perfectly. 
For the purpose of this study, an additional belief rating scale was added to rate 
how often participants used particular strategies to try to prevent checking rituals, 
with 0 being do not use this strategy at all and 100 being always use this 
strategy: 
Searching your memoryfor a clear picture. 
Try to distract yourselffrom having thoughts. 
Try to reason with yourself that you did check correctly. 
Try to accept that you will never be certain. 
This scale was added to determine the extent to which participants were already 
using the strategies tested out in each experimental condition. 
2.5.2 Dependent measures. 
Four rating scales were constructed to assess the dependent variables (see 
appendix D). The vividness and confidence scales were taken from Van den 
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Hout and Kindt (2003b), and the urge to check and anxiety scales were taken 
from Fisher and Wells (2005b). 
1. Memory detail: Participants were asked to indicate how detailed and 
clear their recollection of the exposure task was on a scale ranging from 0 
('not detailed) to 100 ('extremely detailed). 
2. Confidence in memory: Participants were asked to indicate how 
accurate they felt their memory was of the exposure task on a scale 
ranging from 0 (absolutely not confident) to 100 (absolutely confident). 
3. Urge to check: Participants were asked to indicate their urge to engage in 
the compulsive checking ritual on a scale ranging from 0 (1 do notfeel the 
urge to neutralize at all) to 100 (my urge to neutralize could not be any 
stronger). 
4. Anxiety/distress: Participants were asked to rate their anxiety/distress 
level on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all anxiousldistressed) to 100 (the 
most anxiousIdistressed I have ever been). 
Each scale was administered at 1,3, and 5 minutes during the control and 
experimental conditions. Participants were asked to write down a number 
between 0- 100 that reflected how they were feeling at that current time. This 
particular method of measurement is widely used within cognitive research 
(Fisher & Wells, 2005b) and clinical practice (Wells, 1997). 
2.5.3 Helpfulness ratings and manipulation check. 
Participants were asked to rate how helpful they felt each task would be in 
managing their anxiety on a 0- 100 scale, with 0 being not at all helpful and 100 
being extremely helpful. Participants were asked to provide these ratings 
immediately after each rationale for the experimental condition was read out. 
Two manipulation checks were carried out immediately after the five minute 
experimental tasks: 
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1. Participants were asked to indicate how well they felt they had completed 
the task on a scale ranging from 0 (1 completed the task very poorly) to 
100 (1 completed the task perfectly). 
2. Participants were asked to indicate how well they had managed to stay 
focused on the task on a scale ranging from 0 (1 didn't manage to stay 
focused at alý to 100 (1 managed to stay completelyfocused on the task). 
Z5.4 Feedhack questionnaire. 
This short questionnaire consisted of several questions relating to the 
helpful and unhelpful aspects of taking part in the study (see appendix E). The 
questionnaire was designed to offer further evidence of which techniques may be 
helpful in therapy. Participants were sent the questionnaire, along with a pre-paid 
envelope, one month after completing the research. They were informed that any 
information provided would be anonymous and used only for the purpose of the 
study. 
Z6 Procedure 
2.6.1 Assessment session. 
A detailed research protocol was followed for the assessment session and 
the two subsequent experimental sessions (see appendix F). The protocol was 
designed in a semi-structured interview format so that the researcher could 
follow the same procedure but be free to answer any queries the participant had 
or elaborate on instructions where necessary. 
At the start of the assessment session, the researcher read out the 
participant information sheet and answered any questions the participant had 
about the study. If the participant was interested in taking part they were asked to 
sign a consent form (see appendix G). At this stage, participants were reminded 
that the study involved taking part in a number of brief tasks that asked them to 
try out different ideas. They were informed that although the tasks would not 
cause them any harm, they may not necessarily do them any good and it would 
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be advisable to not repeat any of the techniques used in the study outside of the 
research room. 
Participants were then assessed for suitability using the MINI (Sheehan 
et al., 1998). If participants met criteria for more than one Axis-I disorder, the 
researcher asked further questions to identify which difficulty was the primary 
presenting problem. For example, participants were asked about their potential 
goals for treatment and what they would hope to focus on in therapy. Those that 
meet criteria on the MINI were then asked to complete six descriptive measures 
(CBOCI, PI, MOCI, WOCI, BAI, BDI-II). The researcher read out the 
instructions for each descriptive measure before handing the questionnaires to the 
participant to complete themselves. One participant asked the researcher to read 
out the questions aloud. Participants were then asked about situations that lead to 
checking behaviours with at least a subjective anxiety rating of 70 or above (out 
of 100). This was to ensure that the experiments used in the experimental 
sessions would elicit enough anxiety to be able to detect any differences. The 
situation with the highest anxiety rating was chosen for the experimental 
sessions. If more than one situation was identified with the same anxiety rating, 
the researcher chose the situation that could most accurately be replicated in an 
experimental setting. Participants were then informed that the situation discussed 
would become the focus for the rest of the study. Table 3 shows the stimuli 
identified for each participant. 
Table 3. Checking stimuli identified for each participant. 
Participant Checking stimuli Participants predicted rating 
of anxiety 
1 Gas cooker 100 
2 Digital phones 80 
3 Gas cooker 100 
,4 
Gas cooker 100 
5 Electric cooker 100 
The rituals described by participants who identified gas or electric 
cookers as their stimuli were all similar. Participants reported that they would 
repeatedly check whether they had turned off the hob and oven dials correctly 
and that the switch at the plug socket was turned off. The participant who 
identified the digital phones as their stimuli described repeatedly checking that 
the three cordless phones in her house were all correctly in their holders and that 
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the digital display on each phone was visible, indicating that the phones were 
switched on. 
Participants were also asked questions to elicit dysfunctional beliefs 
commonly associated with OCD. For example, a question on inflated 
responsibility included 'what do youfeel would happen ifyou didn't go back and 
check? ', and a question on intolerance of uncertainty included 'How certain 
wouldyou have to be to not go back and check? ' To avoid replication, the 
researcher focused on areas highlighted by the descriptive measures. On 
completion of the assessment session, the participant was informed that a letter 
would be sent to their GP to notify them of the study (see appendix H). 
26.2 Overview of experimental sessions. 
Participants met the researcher for two further sessions of approximately 
one hour each. Where possible, the experimental sessions were conducted in the 
person's own home to increase the ecological validity of the experiments. Each 
session consisted of an ABC design and tested out one of the two hypotheses. 
The basic structure for each experiment was the same, with the only difference 
being the rationale and manipulation. Each experimental condition occurred 
straight after a brief exposure to the feared stimuli identified in the assessment 
session. The experimental condition was explained to the participant in the form 
of a written rationale. Both the researcher and the participant were given a copy 
of the rationale so that it could be read out aloud and followed together. The 
rationales were read out once the participant had been exposed to their feared 
stimuli and had returned to the research room. For the purpose of this study, the 
tresearch room' was the room in which the participant completed the 
experimental tasks and that did not contain the feared stimuli. 
Participants received the baseline experimental test (condition A) 
followed by the two counterbalanced experimental conditions (B and Q in a 
single session. Participants were randomly assigned to the order of B and C using 
a random number generator. For the purpose of the random number generator 
condition B was allocated a label of T and condition C was allocated a label of 
'2' before being randomized eight times. Each participant was told that ratings of 
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memory detail and confidence, urge to check, and level of anxiety/distress would 
be taken on three occasions (1,3 and 5 min) during each condition. All 
participants were given practice in making their ratings before beginning the 
experiment. 
The experimental sessions were piloted on several clients currently 
involved in treatment at a clinical psychology department. No major amendments 
were made following these pilot sessions. 
26.3 Study 1: Memory search. 
2.6.3.1 Experimental session 1. 
Experimental session I consisted of a baseline experimental test (A) followed by 
two experimental conditions (B & C). Condition B and C were counterbalanced, 
with two participants receiving condition B then C and three participants 
receiving condition C then B. At the start of the session, participants were 
reminded that they would be taking part in several brief tasks that would involve 
them being exposed to situations that usually cause them to check. They were 
told that they may expect to feel a little anxious and that they were free to 
withdraw from the study at any time. The participants were then shown the rating 
scales and were told that they would be asked to fill them in at three different 
points in time. Participants were told that they would need to fill in the rating 
scales as quickly as possible and that it may help if they spent a few minutes 
familiarising themselves with each question. 
Stage 1: baseline experiment (condition A): Participants were told that they 
would shortly be exposed to the fear-provoking stimuli identified in the 
assessment session. They were then informed that they would be asked to spend 
five minutes doing what they normally do with the exception of going back to 
check. The researcher accompanied the participant to the fear-provoking stimuli 
and gave clear instructions of what they needed to do. For example, a participant 
who frequently checks the cooker was asked to turn each hob and oven on and 
off before turning away from the cooker and walking out of the room. 
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Participants were reminded that they should not go back to check. Once the 
participants understood what was required of them, the researcher left the 
participant alone to complete the exposure task. This procedure is in line with 
previous research that suggests that completing exposure tasks in the absence of 
the researcher elicits significantly stronger urges to check than if the researcher is 
present (Roper & Rachman, 1976). On return to the research room, the 
participant was asked to spend five minutes doing what they normally do when 
they have just checked something (with the exception of going back to check). 
The researcher noted down the time on the research protocol before the task 
started. During the five minutes, participants were asked to fill in the rating 
scales at 1,3, and 5 minute intervals. A stop watch was used by the researcher to 
indicate when they needed to ask the participant to pause what they were doing 
and fill in the rating scales. All times were recorded on the research protocol. The 
researcher remained in the room during the five minutes in order to administer 
the rating scales and time the task. However, the researcher sat discreetly in the 
comer of the room and completed documentation in an effort to minimize the 
impact of having the researcher present. 
Stage 2: experiment (condition B): Condition B involved a simple computer 
task, designed to prevent the participant from using a memory search. It 
consisted of a power point presentation of images of the fear provoking stimuli 
(e. g., cookers, digital phones) which were set up after the assessment session for 
each participant. Each presentation consisted of 22 images of fear provoking 
stimuli found on the internet and 3 images of the actual stimuli that participants 
were exposed to. In the case of home visits, these pictures were taken before the 
start of the experimental session and uploaded onto the computer. The 25 images 
were randomized with a random number generator to appear 100 times. The 
images were set to flash up on the screen every two seconds. The aim of this task 
was to ensure that the participant retained the image of the feared stimuli in their 
mind but captured their attentional resources sufficiently to prevent them from 
using a memory search. 
Participants were informed that they would shortly be repeating the 
exposure to their fear provoking stimuli but instead of returning to the research 
room to spend five minutes doing what they normally do, they would be given a 
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rationale describing a simple computer task. Participants were informed that 
clear instructions would be given in the rationale and the task would only start 
once they were clear about what was required of them. The participant then 
repeated their exposure to the fear-provoking stimuli in exactly the same way as 
in the baseline experiment. On returning to the research room, a rationale for a 
simple computer task was read out. The written instructions were as follows: 
I would like you to spendfive minutes doing a computer task. This will 
involve looking at different pictures on the computer screen and deciding 
which ones you have seen before. 
When you are ready, this computer will keep showing different pictures of 
(insertfeared stimuli). Each picture will remain on the screenfor two 
seconds before it changes to the next picture. Each time you see a new 
picture, I would like you to tell me whether you think is it the same as the 
(insertfeared stimuli) you were exposed to earlier. Do you understand? 
Once it was clear what was required of them, participants were asked to 
rate how helpful they felt the task might be in managing their anxiety on a 0- 100 
scale. The rating was recorded on the research protocol. Participants were then 
told that they would spend five minutes completing the computer task and would 
be asked to rate the same rating scales at 1,3, and 5 minute intervals. As in the 
baseline experiment, a stop watch was used by the researcher to indicate when 
they needed to ask the participant to pause what they were doing and fill in the 
rating scales. All times were recorded on the research protocol. Again, the 
researcher remained in the room during this process but sat in a comer and 
completed documentation. At the end of the five minutes, participants were 
asked to use a 0- 100 rating scale to indicate how well the felt they had completed 
the task and how focused they had managed to stay on the task. 
Stage 3: experiment (condition Q: Participants were told that they would 
shortly be repeating the exposure to their fear-provoking stimuli but instead of 
returning to the research room to spend five minutes doing what they normally 
do, they would be given a rationale about the use of memory searching. 
Participants were informed that clear instructions would be given in the rationale 
and the task would only start once they were clear about what was required of 
them. The participant then repeated their exposure to the fear-provoking stimuli 
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in exactly the same way as in the baseline experiment. On returning to the 
research room, a rationale for memory searching as a technique people 
sometimes use to prevent them from checking was read out to the participant. 
Participants were told that they would be asked to spend five minutes performing 
a memory search by working through a memory of their last actions in detail to 
try to get a clear picture in their mind of exactly what happened. The written 
instructions were as follows: 
Feeling the urge to check something over and over again can take up a 
lot of time and can be distressing. It is commonfor people with this urge 
to try to resist checking by attempting to remember whether they carried 
out the action correctly the last time they checked 
Some people with an urge to check will try to do this through a technique 
called 'memory searching'. Memory searching is when you try to work 
through a memory ofyour last actions in detail. That is, try to get a clear 
picture in your mind of exactly what happened. For example, a person 
whofeels an urge to check whether they locked their car door would 
search their memory in an attempt to gain a clear picture of their actions 
right up to when they walked awayfrom the car. 
I would like you to try this 'memory searching' techniquefor the nextfive 
minutes. Search your memoryfor whether you (insertfeared stimuli). 
Once it was clear what was required, the participant was asked how 
helpful they felt the task might be in managing their anxiety on a scale of 0- 100. 
The rating was recorded by the researcher on the research protocol. The 
participant then kept the rationale in front of them and was asked to spend five 
minutes doing a memory search. During the five minutes, participants were 
asked to fill in the rating scales at 1,3, and 5 minute intervals. As in the baseline 
experiment, a stop watch was used by the researcher to indicate when they 
needed to ask the participant to pause what they were doing and fill in the rating 
scales. All times were recorded on the research protocol. Again, the researcher 
remained in the room during this process but sat in a comer and completed 
documentation. At the end of the five minutes, participants were asked to use a 0- 
100 rating scale to indicate how well the felt they had completed the task and 
how focused they had managed to stay on the task. 
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Participants were informed that they had completed experimental session I 
and were reminded that although the tasks may not cause them any harm, they 
may also not do them any good. Participants were advised to not attempt to use 
the strategies learnt in the session outside of the research room 
2 6.4 Study 2: reasoning with yourself 
Experimental session 2 took place approximately one week after the first 
experimental session. The design of the experiment was exactly the same as 
experiment I except that the rationales tested hypothesis 2. Experimental session 
2 therefore consisted of a baseline experimental test (A) followed by two 
experimental conditions (B & C). Condition B and C were counterbalanced, with 
three participants receiving condition B then C and two participants receiving 
condition C then B. The baseline task asked participants to spend five minutes 
doing what they would normally do with the exception of going back to check. 
The experimental conditions provided rationales for 'accepting uncertainty' 
(condition B), and 'reasoning with yourself' (Condition Q. 
Stage 2: experiment (condition B): Rationale 3 described 'accepting 
uncertainty' as a technique some people use when they are worried about 
whether they performed an action correctly last time they checked. The rationale 
asked participants to spend five minutes reminding themselves that there is no 
certainty in life. Participants were asked to do this by watching what goes on in 
their mind and looking out for when their mind tried to look for uncertainty. 
Each time this happened, participants were asked to remind themselves that there 
is no such thing as certainty in life and they should accept the small uncertainty. 
The written instructions were as follows: 
Different people use different ways ofdealing with their worries about 
(insertfeared stimuli). We want tofind out how effective the different 
strategies are. 
One thing people do when they are worried about (insertfeared stimuli) 
is to accept that there is no certainty in life. Although some bad things 
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are very unlikely to happen, we can never be certain that they wont. What 
some people do is remind themselves of this. 
For the nextfive minutes, I would like you to practise accepting 
uncertainty. I want you to do this by watching what goes on in your mind 
While you are doing this, you may notice that your mind tries to lookfor 
uncertainty. For example, your mind may start to ask whether it is certain 
that (insertfeared stimuli). 
Each time this happens, try to remindyourself that although it is very 
unlikely that (insertfeared stimuli), it is impossible to be certain, because 
there is no such thing as certainty in life. Remindyourself that because 
there is no such thing as certainty in life, you are going to accept the 
small uncertainty. Once you have done this, switch back to watching what 
goes on in your mind 
Go through the stages each time you spot your mind trying to searchfor 
certainty. Keep watching your mind in this wayfor the nextfive minutes. 
Stage 3: experiment (condition C): Rationale 4 described 'reasoning with 
yourself as a technique some people use when they are worried about whether 
they performed an action correctly last time they checked. The rationale asked 
participants to spend five minutes asking themselves five specific questions to try 
to help them feel more certain. The written instructions were as follows: 
Different people use different ways ofdealing with their worries about 
(insertfeared stimuli). We want tofind out how effective the different 
strategies are. 
One thing people do when they are worried about (insertfeared stimuli) 
is to reason with themselves to try tofeel more certain. What some people 
do is ask themselves questions to try to get more certainty about (insert 
fearedstimuli). 
For the nextfive minutes, I want you to practise reasoning with yourself 
to try to feel more certain. I want you to do this by attempting to answer 
thefollowing list of questions in your min& 
How certain are you that you did check (insertfeared stimuli) correctly? 
What evidence do you have that you did not check correctly? 
"at is the quality of that evidence? 
What is the evidence that you did check correctly? 
"at is the quality of that evidence? 
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Ifyou get to the end of the questions, work your way through theinfrom 
the start again until thefive minutes are up. 
At the end of experimental session 2, participants were debriefed about the 
predicted hypotheses of the study. The debrief included a reflective component 
on whether the participant found any of the strategies helpful to try and 
overcome their difficulties. In addition, the researcher noted down any comments 
made by the participant about what they felt about each experimental condition 
and their reasons for why a task felt helpful or unhelpfiil. 
Feedback questionnaire. 
Participants were sent a feedback questionnaire in the post one month 
after they had completed the study. The completion of the questionnaire was on a 
voluntary basis and a stamped addressed envelope addressed to the researcher 
was included. Of five questionnaires sent, three were completed and returned. 
Z7 Statistical Analysis 
The experimental data was analyzed using Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences (SPSS) version 13.0. Analysis began with a visual inspection of 
the data, an important strategy in single case research. Because of the small 
sample, it was possible to report frequency data for individual participants rather 
than provide summary statistics (e. g., total scores for the BDI-II rather than the 
mean scores). Change scores for all four experimental conditions were calculated 
for each participant and a mean change score was obtained. Change scores were 
calculated by subtracting the mean rating of one condition from the mean rating 
of another, depending on which order the tasks were given. For example, for 
ABC participants, change scores for the computer task were calculated by 
subtracting the mean rating of the baseline from the mean rating of the computer 
task. Alternatively, for ACB participants, change scores for the computer task 
were calculated by subtracting the mean rating of the memory search from the 
mean rating of the computer task. A more detailed example of the calculation of 
a change score is shown in appendix I. This method of calculating the change 
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score is widely used in single-case research (e. g., Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998; 
Fisher & Wells, 2005b). Originally, it was expected that a Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank Test would be used to determine any significant differences between 
change scores. However, given the small N in the current study it was more 
appropriate to provide a descriptive analysis of the findings. 
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3.0 Results 
3.1 Descriptive Information 
Descriptive statistics for measures of anxiety and depression are shown in 
table 4. The severity of anxiety and depressive symptoms differed between 
participants, ranging from 'minimal' to 'severe'. 
Table 4. Participant scores on general measures. 
Participant BAI raw score BAI range BDI-11 raw score BDI-11 range 
1 19 Moderate 7 Minimal 
2 23 Moderate 16 Mild 
3 5 Minimal I Minimal 
14 26 Severe 29 1 Severe 
15 37 Severe 28 1 Moderate 
Descriptive statistics for measures of obsessive compulsive 
symptornatology are shown in tables 5,6, and 7. Scores on the CBOCI were 
fairly consistent with all five participants scoring in the 'mild to moderate' range 
on the obsession and compulsion subscales, meeting clinical criteria. Only one 
participant's total score fell within the range for 'severe' symptoms, with the 
remaining participants in the 'mild to moderate' range. 
Scores on the OBQ-44 showed that inflated responsibility/over- 
estimation of threat and perfectionism/intolerance of uncertainty were the most 
common dysfunctional beliefs in this sample. One participant scored 
considerably lower on the inflated responsibility subscale compared to the other 
participants. Finally, scores on the MOCI showed that participants commonly 
engaged in behaviours related to the checking subtype of OCD. All five 
participants met the recommended cut-off score of 5 (Gershuny & Sher, 1995) on 
the checking subscale. 
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1 24 Mild/mod 18 Mild/mod 42 Mild/mod 
2 14 Mild/mod 21 Mild/mod 35 Mild/mod 
3 26 Mild/mod 23 Mild/mod 49 Mild/mod 
4 28 Mild/mod 25 Mild/mod 53 Severe 
5 23 Mild/mod 24 Mild/mod 47 Mild/mod 
Table 6. Participant scores on the OBQ44. 
Participant Inflated Perfectionism Over- Total score 
responsibility and importance 
and over- Intolerance of and over- 
estimation of uncertainty control of 
threat subscale subscale thoughts 
subscale 
1 92 40 57 189 
2 36 62 25 123 
3 94 101 34 233 
4 96 83 49 228 
15 78 93 53 224 











1 3 7 4 5 19 
2 4 6 2 4 16 
3 21 61 4 171 19 
4 01 5 2 3 10 
5 51 7 7 7 26 
Participants also completed the Weekly Obsessive Compulsive Inventory 
(WOCI) to provide further information on the strategies participant's use to deal 
with the urge to check. Table 8 summarises individual ratings given on a 0- 100 
scale for each strategy, with 0 being 'do not use this strategy at all to reduce 
checking'and 100 being 'always use this strategy to reduce checking'. 
'Reasoning with yourself was the most commonly used strategy, followed by 
'distraction'. 
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Table 8. Frequency of use of cognitive strategies. 







1 30 50 0 90 
2 50 80 50 60 
3 20 0 50 100 
4 90 0 80 80 
5 90 90 90 100 
3.2 EXPERIMENT I 
Experiment 1 compared a condition in which the participant was asked to 
perform a five-minute memory search with a condition in which the participant 
was asked to engage in a simple computer task. 
3.2.1 Manipulation checks and helpfulness ratings. 
Ratings of how helpful participant's expected each experimental 
condition to be are shown in table 9. Ratings were given on a 0- 100 scale, with 0 
being 'not at all helpful' and 100 being 'extremely helpful'. Only one participant 
predicted that the computer task would be more helpftil than the memory search 
task. 
Table 9. Pre-experiment helpfulness ratings. 
Participant Helpfulness ratings 
Computer task Memory search 
1 60 80 
2 50 40 
3 50 50 
4 0 5 
5 50 90 
Measures of how well participants felt they completed the tasks are 
shown in table 10. Ratings were given on a 0- 100 scale, with 0 being 
completed the task very poorly'and 100 being 'I completed the task perfectly'. 
Four out of five participants rated themselves at 80 or above. One participant was 
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unsure of her success on both tasks and opted for a middle rating. Three out of 
five participants felt they had completed the computer task better than they had 
completed the memory search. Only one person felt that they had completed the 
memory search better. 
Table 10. Manipulation check on completion of the task. 
Participant Extent to which the participant managed to complete 
the task 
Computer task Memory search 
1 100 80 
2 50 50 
3 90 100 
4 100 80 
5 100 80 
Measures of how well participants had managed to focus on the tasks are 
shown in table 11. Ratings were based on a 0- 100 scale with 0 being 'I didn't 
manage to stayfocused at all' and 100 being 'I managed to stay completely 
focused on the task'. Four out of five participants rated themselves at 70 or 
above. Again, one participant was unsure of how well she had been able to stay 
focused throughout the task and opted for a middle rating. Three out of five 
participants stayed more focused on the computer task than the memory search. 
Only one person felt they were able to focus on the memory search more than the 
computer task. 
Table 11. Manipulation check of focusing on the task. 
Participant Extent to which the participant managed to focus on 
the task 
Computer task Memory search 
1 75 80 
2 50 50 
3 90 80 
4 80 70 
51 90 80 
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3.22 Ratings of memory detail. 
Measures of how detailed or clear participants memories were during 
each task are shown in figure 1. Ratings were given on a 0- 100 scale, with 0 
being 'not detailed' and 100 being 'extremely detailed'. It was predicted that the 
use of a memory search immediately after checking would lead to a decrease in 
the detail of a memory compared to a condition that did not use a memory 
search. Four out of five participants rated their memory as being the clearest 
during the baseline experiment, with one person rating their memory as clearest 
during the memory search. When comparing the two experimental conditions, 
four out of five participants rated themselves as having a more detailed memory 
during the memory search in comparison to the computer task, contradictory to 
hypothesis 1. One person rated the same level of detailed memory for both 
experiments. This person differed from the other participants in that they used a 
different experimental stimulus. That is, during the exposure they checked 
whether their digital cordless phones were turned on whereas the other four 
participants checked whether the cooker was turned off. This participant also had 
the lowest rating of inflated responsibility as measured by the WOCI and the 
OBQ-44. 
Change scores were calculated between the baseline and first 
experimental condition, and between the first experimental condition and the 
second experimental condition. For two of the participants, the first experimental 
condition consisted of the computer task whilst for three participants it consisted 
of the memory search task. A more detailed description of the calculation of 
change scores can be found in the method section and in appendix I. Changes 
associated with the memory search condition were computed in a similar way. A 
negative change denotes a decrease in how detailed the participant's memory is 
and a positive change score denotes an increase in how detailed the participant's 
memory is. The change score for the computer task was - 17.47 whilst the change 
score for the memory search was 8.60. Although changes were minimal, these 
results suggest that the introduction of a five minute computer task may serve to 
decrease a participant's ratings of how detailed or clear their memory is. 
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Figure 1. Mean ratings for memory detail during the baseline, computer 
condition, and memory search condition for each participant. 
ýComputer task first Memory search first 












B= baseline, C= computer task, M= memory search 
3. Z3 Ratings of memory confidence. 
Measures of how confident participants were in their memory during each 
task are shown in figure 2. Ratings were given on a 0- 100 scale with 0 being 
6absolutely not confident' and 100 being 'absolutely confident'. It was predicted 
that the use of a memory search immediately after checking would lead to a 
decrease in confidence in memory compared to a condition that did not use a 
memory search. The results display a mixed picture. Two out of five participants 
rated their confidence as being highest during the memory search condition, one 
participant rated their confidence as being highest during the computer task, and 
one person rated their confidence as being the highest during the baseline. The 
final participant rated the baseline and memory search condition at the same 




participants rated their confidence higher in the memory search in comparison to 
the computer task, contradicting hypothesis 1. One person supported the 
hypothesis by rating their confidence higher during the computer task than the 
memory search task. The only difference between this participant and the other 
four participants is that he was the only male in the sample. 
Change scores were calculated for memory confidence in the same way 
as they were for memory detail. A negative change score denotes a decrease in 
confidence and a positive change score denotes an increase in confidence. The 
change score for the computer task was -2.53 whilst the change score for the 
memory search was 5.93. These results suggest that both the computer task and 
the memory search have a minimal effect on participant's ratings. 
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Figure 2. Mean ratings for confidence in memory during the baseline, 












task first Memory search first 
S4 S2 S3 S5 
B= baseline, C= computer task, M= memory search 
3.2.4 Ratings of urge to check. 
Measures of participant's urge to check during each task are shown in 
figure 3. Ratings were given on a 0- 100 scale with 0 being V do notfeel the urge 
to check at all' and 100 being 'my urge to check could not be any stronger'. It 
was predicted that the use of a memory search immediately after checking would 
lead to an increase in urge to check compared to a condition that did not use a 
memory search. Three out of five participants rated their urge to check as being 
highest during the baseline condition, one participant rated their urge to check as 




as being the highest during the memory search condition. When comparing the 
two experimental conditions, three out of five participants rated their urge to 
check as higher in the computer task in comparison to the memory search, 
contradicting hypothesis 2. Two participants supported the hypothesis by rating 
their urge to check as higher during the memory search. These participants were 
both exposed to the memory search condition first followed by the computer 
task. There were no other identifiable differences between the two groups. 
Change scores were calculated for urge to check in the same way as they 
were for memory detail. A negative change score denotes a decrease in urge to 
check and a positive change score denotes an increase in urge to check. The 
change score for the computer task was -0.53 whilst the change score for the 
memory search was -6.33. These results suggest that both the computer task and 
the memory search had minimal effects on participants' ratings. 
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Figure 3. Mean ratings of urge to check during the baseline, computer task 
condition, and memory search condition for each participant. 
Computer task first Memory search first 













B= baseline, C= computer task, M= memory search 
3.2.5 Ratings of anxiety. 
Measures of participant's anxiety during each task are shown in figure 4. 
Ratings were given on a 0- 100 scale with 0 being 'not at all anxiousldistressed' 
and 100 being 'the most anxiousldistressed I have ever been'. It was predicted 
that the use of a memory search immediately after checking would lead to an 
increase in anxiety compared to a condition that did not use a memory search. 
Three out of five participants rated their anxiety as being highest duning the 
baseline condition, one participant rated their anxiety as being highest during the 




memory search condition. When comparing the two experimental conditions, 
three out of five participants rated their anxiety as higher in the computer task in 
comparison to the memory search, contradicting hypothesis 2. Two participants 
supported the hypothesis by rating their anxiety as higher during the memory 
search. As with the urge to check ratings, these participants were both exposed to 
the memory search condition first followed by the computer task. There were no 
other identifiable differences between the two groups. 
Change scores were calculated for anxiety ratings in the same way as they 
were for memory detail. A negative change score denotes a decrease in anxiety 
and a positive change score denotes an increase in anxiety. The change score for 
the computer task was -0.33 whilst the change score for the memory search was 
-7.93. These results suggest that both the computer task and the memory search 
have a minimal effect on participant's ratings, although the memory search may 
serve to slightly decrease levels of anxiety. 
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Figure 4. Mean ratings of anxiety during the baseline, computer task, and 
the memory search task for each participant. 
Computer task first Memory search first 














baseline, C= computer task, M= memory search 
3.2.6 Findings in relation to hypothesis I and 2. 
Hypothesis I predicted that the use of a memory search would decrease 
memory detail and confidence, in comparison to a task that did not allow for a 
memory search. Hypothesis 2 predicted that the use of a memory search would 
increase urge to check and anxiety, compared to a task that did not allow for a 
memory search. Out of the five participants, three individuals failed to support 
any of the hypotheses and one person supported hypothesis 2 only. One 
participant supported all the hypotheses with the exception of memory detail. 
This participant obtained the highest score on the BAI, failing in the 'severe' 
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range, and the second highest score on the BDI-II, falling in the 'moderate' 
range. On the WOCI, this participant gave the joint highest frequency rating of 
using distraction as a method to prevent themselves from checking, and the 
highest rating of using a memory search. Finally, they gave the highest rating for 
how helpful they predicted the memory search task to be prior to the start of the 
cxpenment. 
3.3 EXPERIMENT 2 
Experiment 2 compared a condition in which participants were asked to 
try and accept uncertainty with a condition in which participants were asked to 
reason with themselves. 
3.3.1 Manipulation checks and helpfulness ratings. 
Ratings of how helpful participant's expected each experimental 
condition to be are shown in table 12. Ratings were given on a 0- 100 scale, with 
0 being 'not at all helpful' and 100 being 'extremely helpful'. Only one 
participant predicted that the acceptance task would be more helpful than the 
reasoning task. 
Table 12. Pre-experimental helpfulness rating. 
Participant Helpfulness ratings 
Acceptance task Reasoning task 
1 40 95, 
2 40 70 
3 so 85 
4 50 40 
5 80 80 
Measures of how well participants felt they completed the tasks are 
shown in table 13. Ratings were given on a 0- 100 scale, with 0 being 'I 
completed the task very poorly' and 100 being 'I completed the task perfectly'. 
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Ratings for the acceptance task were mixed. Two participants felt they had 
completed the task well and rated themselves at 80, two participants were unsure 
of their performance and opted for a middle rating, and one participant struggled 
to complete the task and rated their performance as 10. The majority of 
participants felt they had completed the reasoning task better than the acceptance 
task with four out of five participants rating themselves as 70 or above. Only one 
participant felt they had performed better on the acceptance task. 
Table 13. Manipulation check on completion of the task. 
Participant Extent to which participants managed to complete the 
task 
Acceptance task Reasoning task 
1 80 60 
2 50 70 
3 80 100 
4 50 80 
5 10 80 
Measures of how well participants managed to focus on the tasks are 
shown in table 14. Ratings were based on a 0- 100 scale with 0 being 'I didn't 
manage to stayfocused at all' and 100 being 'I managed to stay completely 
focused on the task'. Ratings for the acceptance task were mixed. Two 
participants felt they had focused on the task well and rated themselves at 80 or 
above, one participant was unsure of how focused they had stayed on the task 
and opted for a middle rating, and two participants felt they had struggled to stay 
focused on the task and rated themselves below 50. Four out of five participants 
stayed more focused on the reasoning task than the acceptance task. Only one 
person felt they were more focused on the acceptance task. 
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Table 14. Manipulation check of focusing on the task. 
Participant Managed to focus on the task 
Acceptance task Reasoning task 
1 80 90 
2 50 65 
3 40 80 
4 100 80 
5 10 80 
3.3.2 Ratings of memory detail. 
Measures of how detailed or clear participants memories were during 
each task are shown in figure 5. Ratings were given on a 0- 100 scale, with 0 
being 'not detailed' and 100 being 'extremely detailed'. It was predicted that a 
reasoning task immediately after checking would lead to a decrease in memory 
detail compared to a condition in which the participant is encouraged to accept 
uncertainty. Three out of five participants rated their memory as being the 
clearest during the reasoning task, with one person rating their memory as 
clearest during the baseline, and one person rating their memory as clearest 
during the acceptance task. When comparing the two experimental conditions, 
three out of five participants rated themselves as having a more detailed memory 
during the reasoning task in comparison to the acceptance task, contradicting 
hypothesis 3. Only one person supported hypothesis 3 by rating their memory as 
clearest during the acceptance task. During manipulation checks, this person 
indicated that they had managed to focus on the acceptance task 100% which 
was the highest rating in the sample. 
Change scores were calculated between the baseline and first 
experimental condition, and between the first experimental condition and the 
second experimental condition. For three of the participants the first 
experimental condition consisted of the acceptance task whilst for two 
participants it consisted of the reasoning task. A more detailed description of the 
calculation of change scores can be found in the method section and appendix 1. 
Changes associated with the reasoning condition were computed in a similar 
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way. A negative change score denotes a decrease in how detailed the 
participant's memory is and a positive change score denotes an increase in how 
detailed the participant's memory is. The change score for the acceptance task 
was -7.20 whilst the change score for the reasoning task was 9.40. These results 
suggest that both the accepting uncertainty task and the reasoning task have a 
minimal effect on participant's ratings, although the reasoning task may serve to 
slightly increase memory detail. 
Figure 5. Mean ratings for memory detail during the baseline condition, 
acceptance condition, and reasoning condition for each participant. 
Acceptance task first Reasoning task first 













3.3.3 Ratings of memory confidence. 
Measures of how confident participants were in their memory during each 
task are shown in figure 6. Ratings were given on a 0- 100 scale with 0 being 
BARB ARBARB RAB RA 
Condition 
B= baseline, A= acceptance task, R= reasoning task 
72 
'absolutely not confident' and 100 being 'absolutely confident'. It was predicted 
that a reasoning task immediately after checking would lead to a decrease in 
memory confidence compared to a condition that encouraged the participant to 
accept uncertainty. The results display a mixed picture. Two out of five 
participants rated their confidence as being highest during the reasoning task, one 
participant rated their confidence as being highest during the acceptance task, 
and one participant rated their confidence as being the highest during the 
baseline. The final participant rated all three conditions at the same level. When 
comparing the two experimental conditions, two out of five participants rated 
their confidence higher in the acceptance task in comparison to the reasoning 
task, supporting hypothesis 3. Two participants contradicted hypothesis 3 by 
rating their confidence higher during the reasoning task than the acceptance task. 
There were no obvious differences between these two groups. 
Change scores were calculated for memory confidence in the same way 
as they were for memory detail. A negative change score denotes a decrease in 
confidence and a positive change score denotes an increase in confidence. The 
change score for the acceptance task was -7.33 whilst the change score for the 
reasoning task was 7.93. These results suggest that both the accepting uncertainty 
task and the reasoning task had a minimal effect on memory confidence, 
although the introduction of a five minute reasoning task may serve to slightly 
increase participant's ratings of how confident they are in their memory. 
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Figure 6. Mean ratings for conifidence in memory during the baseline, 
acceptance, and reasoning conditions for each participant. 
Acceptance task first Reasoning task first 
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B= baseline, A= acceptance task, R= reasoning task 
3.3.4 Ratings of urge to check. 
Measures of participant's urge to check during each task are shown in 
figure 7. Ratings were given on a 0- 100 scale with 0 being V do not. feel the urge 
to check at all' and 100 being 'my urge to check could not be any stronger'. It 
was predicted that a reasoning task immediately after checking would lead to an 
increase in urge to check compared to a condition that encouraged participants to 
accept uncertainty. Four out of five participants rated their urge to check as being 
highest during the baseline condition, with one participant rating their urge to 
check as being highest during the acceptance task. When comparing the two 
experimental conditions, three out of five participants rated their urge to check as 
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higher in the acceptance task in comparison to the reasoning task, contradicting 
hypothesis 4. Two participants supported hypothesis 4 by rating their urge to 
check as higher during the reasoning task. On pre-experimental measures, these 
two participants gave the highest ratings for how frequently they try to accept 
uncertainty to prevent themselves from checking. They also rated distraction 
higher in comparison to the other participants. There were no other identifiable 
differences between the two groups. 
Change scores were calculated for urge to check in the same way as they 
were for memory detail. A negative change score denotes a decrease in urge to 
check and a positive change score denotes an increase in urge to check. The 
change score for the acceptance task was -4.67 whilst the change score for the 
reasoning task was -4.53. These results suggest that both the accepting 
uncertainty task and the reasoning task had a minimal effect on reducing the urge 
to check. 
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Figure 7. Mean ratings of urge to check during the baseline, acceptance 
condition, and reasoning condition for each participant. 
Acceptance task first Reasoning task flrst 
S2 S3 S5 Sl S4 
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B= baseline, A= acceptance task, R= reasoning task 
3.3.5 Ratings of anxiety. 
Measures of participant's anxiety during each task are shown in figure 8. 
Ratings were given on a 0- 100 scale with 0 being 'not at all anxious1distressed' 
and 100 being 'the most anxiousldistressed I have ever been'. It was predicted 
that a reasoning task would lead to an increase in anxiety compared to a 
condition that encouraged the participant to accept uncertainty. Three out of five 
participants rated their anxiety as being highest during the baseline condition, 
whereas two participants rated their anxiety highest during the acceptance task. 




rated their anxiety as higher during the acceptance task in comparison to the 
reasoning task, contradicting hypothesis 4. Two participants supported 
hypothesis 4 by rating their anxiety as higher during the reasoning task. As with 
the urge to check ratings, these participants both reported trying to accept 
uncertainty and using distraction as a way to prevent them from checking more 
than the other participants on the pre-experimental measures. There were no 
other identifiable differences between the two groups. 
Change scores were calculated for anxiety ratings in the same way as they 
were for memory detail. A negative change score denotes a decrease in anxiety 
and a positive change score denotes an increase in anxiety. The change score for 
the acceptance task was -2.94 whilst the change score for the reasoning task was 
-5.73. These results suggest that both the accepting uncertainty task and the 
reasoning task had a minimal effect on levels of anxiety. 
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Figure 8. Mean ratings of anxiety during the baseline, acceptance, and 
reasoning conditions for each participant. 
Acceptance task first Reasoning task first 













B= baseline, A= acceptance task, R= reasoning task 
3.3.6 Findings in relation to hypothevis 3 and 4. 
Out of the five participants, three individuals failed to support any of the 
hypotheses and one person supported hypothesis 4 only. One participant 
supported all the hypotheses. This participant was the only person to score in the 
'severe' range on the BDI-11 and the C-BOCL In addition they obtained the 
second highest score on the BAI, also scoring in the 'severe' range. On the 
WOCI, this participant gave the joint highest frequency rating for the use of 
distraction as a method to prevent themselves from checking, and the second 
highest rating for trying to accept uncertainty. This may have influenced the 
participant's predictions of how useful the accepting uncertainty task was in 
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managing their anxiety. Finally, this participant was the only person to suggest 
they had managed to focus on the acceptance task 100% and the only participant 
to predict that the acceptance task would be more helpful than the reasoning task. 
3.4 Feedback questionnaire 
Three out of five participants returned the feedback questionnaire. 
Table 15 shows the responses of each participant. The information suggests that 
no participants struggled to understand or complete the tasks. The implications of 
this will be discussed further in the discussion section. 
Table 15. Responses for each participant on the feedback questionnaire. 
Question Participant 
3 5 
How easy was it to follow the Easy Very easy Neither easy or 
instructions? diff icult 
How helpful did you feel Very helpful Neither helpful Very helpful 
taking part was? or unhelpftil 
Have you used any of the No No Yes 
techniques learrit in the 
session? 
How have your difficulties No change No change No change 




4.1 Key Findingsfrom the Study 
The current study sought to identify the effect of two hypothesized 
cognitive safety behaviours used during exposure with individuals with OCD 
(checking subtype). Because previous research suggests that individuals with 
checking rituals are more likely to have an intolerance of uncertainty (Tolin et 
al., 2003), it was hypothesised that the use of a memory search and a reasoning 
task immediately after checking would have a maladaptive effect on memory 
detail and confidence and on levels of anxiety and urge to check. The findings in 
the current study were mixed. A minority of participants appeared to support 
some of the hypotheses whilst other participants did not, although in all cases any 
changes were minimal. The calculation of a mean change score for each 
condition failed to support any of the hypotheses. That is, the use of a memory 
search and the use of a reasoning task did not appear to have a maladaptive effect 
on individuals with OCD (checking subtype). However, it is important to 
acknowledge that the calculation of change scores in the current study were 
limited to detecting differences between groups based on the order in which the 
tasks were performed. It is possible that more differences may have been 
identified if data analysis had been extended to test group changes from baseline 
in both experiments. Because of the small sample size in this study, any 
conclusions should be interpreted with caution and it may therefore be more 
appropriate to conclude that there were no major differences between the four 
conditions in terms of their effect on memory detail, confidence, urge to check 
and anxiety. 
The finding that the manipulation of cognitive strategies during exposure 
in individuals with OCD does not appear to facilitate change is in keeping with 
conclusions from recent research. Meta-analyses of studies that directly compare 
cognitive-behavioural treatments with Exposure and Response Prevention (ERP) 
have found that the behavioural components of treatment tend to be more 
efficacious in reducing obsessive and compulsive symptoms than cognitive 
interventions (Abramowitz, Franklin, & Foa, 2002; Eddy, Dutra, Bradley, & 
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Western, 2004). Other studies have shown CBT and ERP to be equally effective 
(e. g., McLean et al., 200 1). In addition, ERP has been shown to produce similar 
changes on cognitive belief questionnaires to CBT (e. g., McLean et al., 2001) 
and an equivalent rate of refusals, drop-outs, homework non-compliance and 
treatment non-response (Whittal et al., 2005). Such findings have led to the 
argument that there is little evidence to suggest that the cognitive components of 
CBT add to the effectiveness of traditional behaviour therapy (Steketee et al., 
2002). Indeed, some authors have suggested that cognitive treatments could be 
counterproductive by diluting the amount of ERP that patients receive in the 
course of treatment (Clark, 2005). Given the evidence for the effectiveness of 
ERP, it is possible that this study provides further support for the argument that 
exposure is the most important component of treatment for individuals with 
OCD. However, before making conclusions of this kind, it is important to 
consider the limitations of the study, along with any alternative explanations for 
the current findings. 
4.2 Limitations and Alternative Explanations of the Study 
4.2.1 Assessing validity. 
Before the null hypothesis can be accepted, it is important to consider 
whether any influencing factors within the design or sample of the study can 
account for the results. A useful way of considering these alternative 
explanations is to evaluate potential threats to validity by using the framework 
developed by Cook and Campbell (1979). Cook and Campbell (1979) suggest 
that there are four main types of validity: 
Internal validity - 'The approximate validity with which statements can be made 
about whether there is a causal relationship from one variable to another in the 
form in which the variables were manipulated or measured'. 
Statistical-conclusion validity -'Inferences about whether it is reasonable to 
presume covariation given a specified a level and the obtained variances'. 
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Construct validity -'The approximate validity with which one can make 
generalizations about higher-order constructs from research operations'. 
External validity - The approximate validity with which conclusions are drawn 
about the generalisability of a causal relationship to and across populations of 
persons, setting, and times' 
Cook and Campbell (1979, p. 37-39). 
This framework will be used to consider the various limitations of the study. 
4.22 Sample bias. 
The design of the study served to minimise threats to external validity. 
For example, referrals to clinical psychology departments over a six month 
period were approached to take part in the study which increases the likelihood 
of representing those individuals who are likely to seek psychological treatment. 
However, one of the major threats to external validity in this study was the low 
sample size. Although single case experimental methods are ideal for 'difficult to 
recruit' populations, the small sample size weakens the generalisibility of the 
study and makes it difficult to suggest whether the sample did end up 
representing the target population. Response rates in the current study were low. 
Only 9 out of 27 (33%) potential participants returned their response sheets to 
express interest in the study. In addition, because the researcher was restricted by 
ethical guidelines on data protection, it was not possible to obtain data on those 
individuals who did not respond to the invitation to take part in the study. Sample 
biases cannot therefore be ruled out. For example, it is possible that clients with 
more severe symptoms of OCD did not feel able to take part in the study and did 
not therefore return the reply slip. 
Because of recruitment difficulties, it was not possible to stick to the 
original inclusion and exclusion criteria for all participants. That is, one 
participant had received a course of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy within the 
last two years. Given that individuals with OCD are already known to be a 
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heterogeneous population, inter-subject variability may have contributed to the 
lack of consistent results. Finally, because only one researcher conducted the 
experimental sessions in this study, it is not possible to generalise the findings 
across therapists. A factorial design may have ruled out some of the threats to 
generalisibility. However, this was not feasible in the current study due to the 
cost and time scale implications, as well as the need for a large sample (Barlow 
& Hersen, 1984). 
4.2.3 Order effects. 
The randomised counterbalanced design of this study served to reduce 
threats to internal validity. For example, the results could have been a 
consequence of the order in which the experimental conditions were presented. 
That is, the memory search could have worked better if it was given last either 
because the participant had been able to confirm to themselves that they had 
checked correctly twice before or because emotional change had occurred 
through the process of habituation. This is particularly important given that 
recent experimental work has shown that repeated checking leads participants to 
shift from 'remembering' the most recent check at pre-test to simply 'knowing' 
that they have checked the relevant item at post-test (Van den Hout & Kindt, 
2003a, 2003b). However, in the current study each participant received every 
experimental condition in a random order, with approximately half the sample 
receiving condition B then C, and approximately half receiving condition C then 
B. on examination of individual differences, there appeared to be no relationship 
between the results of the experiment and the order in which participants 
received the conditions, which suggests that differences due to order effects can 
potentially be ruled out. Another possibility is that the results of the second 
experiment were influenced by the completion of the first experiment a week 
earlier. Baseline measurements for each participant were similar in both 
experiments which provide some evidence that any interference effects from the 
first experiment can be ruled out. However, the internal validity of the study may 
have been strengthened if the two experiments had been counterbalanced so that 
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half the participants received experiment I then 2, and half the participants 
received experiment 2 then 1. 
4. Z4 Participant characteristics. 
An advantage of single case designs is that it is possible to develop 
tentative ideas about which type of persons benefit from a particular treatment. 
This may be an important consideration given that previous research on 
'Aptitude x Treatment Interactions' (ATI, Cronbach & Snow, 1977) suggests that 
the effects of psychotherapy depend on specific characteristics of patients and the 
therapies to which they are exposed. More specifically, the ATI hypothesis states 
that appropriate matching of patients with treatment will result in better 
outcomes (Smith & Sechrest, 1991). Although the small sample in the current 
study did not allow for a statistical analysis of the relationship between 
participant characteristics and outcome, a visual inspection of the data was 
undertaken to try to identify any clear differences. For example, the rationale for 
the current study would suggest that individuals with a higher level of intolerance 
of uncertainty would be more likely to experience the maladaptive effect 
predicted in the hypotheses. However, although there was some variability within 
the sample on measures of dysfunctional beliefs, these differences did not appear 
to predict outcome. 
The current study identified one factor that could potentially affect 
treatment response. The two participants who scored in the 'severe' range for 
anxiety and the 'moderate' or 'severe' range for depression both supported the 
hypotheses for at least one experiment. In contrast, participants who did not meet 
clinical criteria on the BDI-11 did not support any of the hypotheses. Previous 
research has suggested that severely depressed obsessive-compulsive clients are 
less likely to gain from behavioural treatments (Foa et al., 1983; Abramowitz, 
Franklin, Street, Kozak, & Foa, 2000). The results of this study, therefore, could 
potentially support the argument that individuals with OCD and co-morbid 
depression and anxiety problems are more likely to use maladaptive coping 
strategies during exposure that impedes the effectiveness of this procedure and 
thus affects the responsiveness to behaviour therapy. In agreement with 
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Abramowitz (2004) and Salkovskis et al. (2007) therefore, such clients may 
benefit from the incorporation of cognitive treatments that address the underlying 
strategies used to prevent checking. Because of the very small N in the current 
study, there is a need to be tentative about any conclusions drawn. More research 
is therefore needed to investigate this potentially important finding further. 
Several other differences were noted on an individual level that could 
possibly have affected the outcome. In experiment 1, the participant who 
supported the majority of the hypotheses was the only male in the sample. In 
addition, two out of the three participants who received the memory search 
condition first rated their urge to check and anxiety as highest during the memory 
search. In experiment 2, the participant who supported both of the hypotheses 
reported that they had managed to stay focused on the accepting uncertainty task 
100%, which was the highest rating of the sample. In addition, prior to the 
experiments, this person also reported the highest usage of acceptance and 
distraction methods as a way of preventing themselves from checking. It is 
possible, therefore, that the mixed results in this study could be due to some of 
the individual differences present in the sample and future research would need 
to investigate this further using a larger sample. 
Some participant characteristics thought to affect response to treatment 
may not have been identified in the current study. For example, previous research 
has shown a relationship between specific personality traits (e. g., schizotypal, 
passive-aggressive) and treatment outcome in a group behaviour therapy 
programme for individuals with OCD (Fricke et al., 2006). In addition, the 
heterogeneous nature of OCD means that it is difficult to control for variability in 
the sample with regard to OCD symptomatology, co-morbidity, and severity of 
symptoms. Standardised measures used in the assessment sessions attempted to 
identify some of this variability. For example, the MOCI was used as a measure 
of compulsive checking and washing behaviours and the C-BOCI provided a 
brief screening of OCD symptornatology as well as the severity of the symptoms. 
However, as clinical reports rarely reveal that an individual only engages in one 
particular type of obsession or compulsion (McKay et al, 2004), it may be 
necessary to determine primary, secondary, and possibly tertiary OCD subtypes 
to gain an insight into treatment effects. To enable comparisons of the occurrence 
and impact of compulsions other than checking behaviours in the current sample, 
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therefore, it may have been useful to include a measure that clearly identifies the 
different subtypes of OCD. For example, the Y-BOCS is often considered 
essential to the assessment of symptoms and includes a checklist of the main 
obsessive and compulsive behaviours. That said, several authors have criticised 
the Y-BOCS for its low discriminant validity and for being a time-consuming 
and costly measure to administer (Taylor, 1998; Feske & Chambless, 2000; 
Antony, 2001). 
4.2.5 Participant and researcher expectancy effects. 
It is possible that results will have been affected by the researcher's 
confidence and experience in conducting the experiments. For example, the 
researcher may have gained confidence as they became more familiar with 
conducting the experiments and this may have had an impact on how easily the 
instructions were explained and how comfortable the participant felt during the 
experiments. A number of measures were put in place to try to reduce these 
threats. First, an experimental protocol was used so that the researcher could 
follow a structured design as closely as possible. However, because participants 
varied in their experiences as well as their ability to understand the instructions, 
it was not possible to strictly adhere to a written protocol at all times. In addition, 
performance on the tasks may have varied according to whether participants 
asked for the rationale to be repeated or explained in more detail. For example, 
feedback from participants immediately after the experiments suggested that 
several participants had initially found it difficult to complete the accepting 
uncertainty task even though not all of them requested additional instructions. It 
is possible, therefore, that those participants who requested more information 
completed the task in a different way to those participants who didn't ask for 
more instructions. A feedback questionnaire was sent out to participants to try to 
gauge how well participants understood the experimental tasks. Out of those who 
responded, there was no indication that participant's found the experiments too 
difficult to follow. However, information provided in these questionnaires needs 
to be interpreted with caution as it is possible that the participants desire to please 
the researcher will have influenced their responses. 
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it is also possible that the dependent variables were influenced by the 
participant's own expectancy effects. For example, participants were informed in 
the information sheet that the purpose of the study was to find out whether 
certain types of thinking make people more anxious and more likely to check. It 
is possible therefore that some hypothesis guessing may have taken place with 
participants making treatment-related hypotheses which were different to the 
researchers. The use of subjective measures of change may have increased the 
likelihood of confounding results in this way. However, the helpftllness ratings 
and manipulation checks used in this study were also used in an attempt to 
control for this effect. In experiment 1, the participant who met the majority of 
hypotheses gave the highest helpfulness rating on the memory search task which 
suggests that expectancy effects did not take place (see page 67). In experiment 
2, however, the participant who supported the hypotheses was the only person to 
suggest that the accepting uncertainty task may be more helpffil than the 
reasoning task which suggests that there may have been an expectancy effect 
occurring (see page 77). In addition, in the current study the researcher was not 
blind to the hypotheses and could therefore not rule out the potential of 
experimenter expectancy effects on the study. For example, Fisher and Wells 
(2005b) recommend a replication of their study with independent assessors to 
rule out potential expectancy effects. 
4.26 Threats to construct validity. 
Rather than the results providing evidence for the lack of effectiveness of 
cognitive mechanisms in CBT, the findings in this study could be due to a failure 
to successfully manipulate the independent variables. This could occur either 
through a failure to replicate 'real life' for the participant or through a failure to 
mimic treatment offered in clinical practice. 
4.2.6.1 Failure to replicate real life. 
The minimal change shown in this study may have been due to flaws in 
the design, in particular, a failure to replicate real life and therefore elicit the 
crucial content and processes seen as central to cognitive theories of OCD. 
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Several measures were put in place to attempt to control for threats to construct 
and ecological validity. For example, the location of the experiments was chosen 
following a discussion with each participant about situations that made them feel 
anxious. Thus, home visits were arranged where participants identified their 
anxiety as being related to their own possessions or family. However, a limitation 
of this was it was more difficult to control for factors influencing their 
performance. For example, for one participant a member of their family walked 
into the room during the experimental session, and for another participant, a 
neighbour was playing loud music during one of the experimental tasks. It is 
possible therefore that these incidents will have affected the participants 
concentration and performance on the tasks. 
in addition, the exposure task was designed in support of the clinical 
guidelines that exposure must take place in the absence of the clinician 
(Salkovski, 1989). For each exposure, therefore, the researcher demonstrated to 
the participant what was required of them before leaving the room for the 
participant to complete the exposure alone. Following the exposure, the 
researcher sat quietly in a comer of the room and completed documentation 
whilst the participant completed the experimental task. However, during the 
baseline experiments each participant rated their anxiety lower than the level 
they had expected to feel when asked during the assessment session. It may be, 
therefore, that despite these actions, the presence of the researcher in the house 
during both the exposure and the experimental conditions still affected the 
participant's concentration and attention to the task at hand, as well as the 
experiment's ability to elicit the dysfunctional beliefs that usual drive anxiety 
and the urge to check. 
The elicitation of dysfunctional beliefs may also have been affected by 
the practical limitations of setting up the experiment. For example, inflated 
responsibility is one of the six belief domains viewed as central to the 
development and maintenance of OCD (OCCWG, 1997,2005) and has been 
shown to be a strong predictor of checking behaviour (Artnz et al., 2007). 
Rachman (1993) argues that checkers in particular experience urges to neutralise 
only in those circumstances in which they assume personal responsibility for 
safety, and Lopatka and Rachman (1995) found that decreases in perceived 
responsibility were followed by significant decreases in anxiety, urge to check, 
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probability of anticipated harm, and estimated length of time needed to finish 
checking. Consistent with this, scores on the OBQ-44 and the WOCI in the 
current study suggested that, for the majority of participants, responsibility 
beliefs were an important maintaining factor of their OCD. On further 
questioning, participants referred to both the responsibility they feel for other 
people, such as their children, and the responsibility for their own safety. 
However, when setting up the experiments it was sometimes difficult to replicate 
the situations that caused participants to check and would therefore elicit these 
inflated responsibility beliefs. For example, several participants found that they 
became most anxious at night time, before they went to bed. In addition, one 
participant felt more anxious when the children were sleeping in the house, and a 
couple of participants talked about feeling distressed if they were in the house 
alone. It is possible therefore that the levels of responsibility that participants felt 
during the experiments did not sufficiently replicate real life and this may have 
contributed to the lack of change during the experiments. 
The lack of findings in the current study may have been due to a failure to 
successfully manipulate the constructs that the experiments had been designed to 
measure. For example, the computer task used in experiment I was designed to 
prevent the participant from performing a memory search whilst retaining an 
image of the feared stimuli in their mind. This ensured that the task did not end 
up being an intervention in itself in the form of distraction. However, feedback 
from the participants suggested that the computer task may have been perceived 
as helpful because they were able to 'check' the feared stimuli when the photos 
of the familiar objects flashed up on screen. For example, one participant 
reported that they were able to see that their cooker was turned off correctly on 
the photo which reduced their anxiety and urge to check. Future research would 
need to consider the limitations of this manipulation and perhaps conduct a more 
rigorous pilot study of alternative designs. 
The timing of when the experimental tasks were performed may also 
have limited the impact of the manipulations. That is, participants were asked to 
perform the experimental tasks when they had returned to the research room, 
immediately after checking the feared stimuli. The experimental tasks were then 
used to either encourage or reduce potentially maladaptive safety seeking 
behaviours; whilst preventing the participant from going back to check. In clinical 
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practice this design approximates Exposure and Response Prevention rather than 
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy, whose primary focus is on enabling participants to 
check the validity of their thoughts, perceptions, and beliefs. Recent research on 
the manipulation of safety seeking behaviours; requires participants to perform 
the manipulations during situational exposure rather than after the exposure has 
occurred (Salkovskis et al., 2007; Wells et al., 1995). It is possible that a similar 
design in the current study would have strengthened the manipulations. 
4.2.6.2 Failure to replicate clinical practice. 
During the pilot phase of this study, the experiments were replicated in 
clinical practice by a Clinical Psychologist seeing clients diagnosed with OCD. 
Feedback from these pilot studies suggested that the results supported the initial 
hypotheses. There are several reasons why this difference in results may have 
occurred. Firstly, it is possible that the sample in the current study differed from 
the clients used in the pilot study. Possible sample biases have already been 
discussed; however they are unlikely to have affected the pilot study sample 
given that they were taken from the same waiting list. Secondly, the difference in 
the results may be due to the knowledge and experience of the qualified clinician 
compared to the researcher. Previous research has shown that the experience of 
the therapist can affect treatment outcome (Taylor, 1999), which is suggested to 
be due to a deeper understanding of general CBT principles and more skill in 
developing a therapeutic alliance (Huppert et al., 2001). However, in the current 
study training was provided prior to the start of data collection and the researcher 
was observed by the clinician during both experiments for one participant. It 
could therefore be that the difference in results was due to the timing of when the 
experiments were conducted, rather than the experience of the clinician. For 
example, 'unrecognised factors' in therapy have long been regarded as crucial to 
positive outcomes (Grencavage & Norcross, 1990). Conducting the experiments 
part way through treatment, therefore, may have allowed for the client to 
establish a good therapeutic alliance with the clinician which helped them to 
engage in the tasks more effectively. Similarly, conducting the experiments part 
way through therapy may have increased the likelihood of expectancy effects on 
subjective ratings of change because the client is more likely to be aware of the 
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research hypotheses. It was for this reason that the decision was made to conduct 
the experimental manipulation before the start of treatment. 
The timing of the research experiments may also have affected results. 
That is, the fact that participants in this sample were on the waiting list for 
therapy, rather than already receiving treatment, may have affected their ability 
to learn and effectively apply some of the techniques commonly used in therapy. 
In support of this, three participants reported that they struggled to understand or 
use some of the experimental tasks, in particular, the ability to accept 
uncertainty. In addition, the participant who supported the hypothesis was the 
only person to suggest that they had managed to stay focused on the task 100%. 
Within clinical practice, it is usual for a clinician to introduce the cognitive- 
behavioural model, and some of its techniques, over several sessions. For 
example, in treatments for Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD), where 
intolerance of uncertainty is very common, a therapist may dedicate a whole 
session to explaining the importance of one's perception of uncertainty, clarifying 
that the treatment's goal is not to eliminate uncertainty, but rather to help 
participants recognize it, accept it, and develop coping strategies when faced 
with uncertain situations (Dugas & Ladouceur, 2000). In addition, techniques 
used to assist with the acceptance of uncertainty are usually found to merge with 
techniques that help clients to reevaluate their beliefs (e. g., Ladouceur et al., 
2000), which may suggest that the technique used in the current study did not 
replicate the techniques used in therapy. 
These factors may suggest that the current study did not allow for 
sufficient time and knowledge to adequately apply the techniques used in the 
study. A similar point has been made in previous research that failed to find 
support for cognitive mechanisms in a group CBT programme (Whittal et al., 
2005). Alternatively, it may be that the length of time given to complete the task 
(five minutes) was too short to produce an effect. However, previous research 
using a similar design to the current study has produced a significant effect 
which suggests that five minutes is adequate to produce change (e. g., Wells & 
Papageorgiou, 2001; Fisher & Wells, 2005b). 
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4.3 Interpretation of the Findings 
Given the limitations of the current study, any conclusions about the 
findings need to be interpreted with caution. It is therefore not possible to suggest 
whether the minimal change indicates a lack of support for the theoretical basis 
of the experiments or whether it was because of underlying methodological 
limitations in the design of the study. The finding that results were mixed, 
however, may be more relevant as it raises several important implications for 
clinical practice and for future research. 
4.3.1 Theoretical implications of the study. 
This study attempted to target cognitive strategies that may be 
particularly relevant to the checking subtype of OCD, with the aim of expanding 
on recent theories and contributing to the refinement and improvement of 
cognitive treatments. Despite selecting a sample of participants whose primary 
difficulty was checking compulsions, there was still a lot of variability in the 
sample in terms of demographic characteristics, co-morbidity with other 
psychological difficulties, and in the dysfunctional beliefs identified to be 
associated with their OCD. It is possible, therefore, that the inconsistent results 
of the present study may partially be a result of this heterogeneity and suggests 
several important implications. 
First, this study could potentially contribute to the debate around the 
suitability of the classic symptom-based subtyping system of OCD. It is 
consistent with the argument that individuals with checking rituals appear to 
show the most variability with respect to how they cluster in factor analytic 
studies (McKay et al., 2004), and perhaps lends support to the view that OCD is 
in fact a group of disorders rather than a unitary syndrome (Taylor, in press). The 
broad range of symptoms seen in OCD, along with the differential response to 
treatment, has naturally led researchers to suggest a need for greater specificity in 
assessment and treatment strategies (e. g., Ball et al., 1996; McKay et al., 2004). 
However, it is argued that there may be more suitable ways of distinguishing 
between people with OCD then the classic subtyping of compulsive behaviours. 
For example, Calamari et al. (2006) suggest that subtyping should be done on the 
basis of core cognitive beliefs or on treatment response rather than by behaviour. 
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Similarly, Taylor et al. (2006) found that it was possible to identify two cognitive 
subtypes of OCD; the OC-high subtype which was characterised by relatively 
high scores on measures of OC-related beliefs, and the OC-low subtype which 
generally did not differ from most controls on these beliefs. It may well be, 
therefore, that more consistent patterns would have emerged in the present study 
if participants were selected on the basis of their beliefs. The identification of six 
core beliefs in individuals with OCD (OCCWG, 1997,200 1) will help future 
research to explore this area further. 
Secondly, if symptom-based subtypes are deemed as unsuitable grouping 
criteria, this raises questions for the development of treatments for OCD. That is, 
rather than attempting to refine treatments to be more specific to symptom-based 
needs, it may be that treatments need to be less specific and focus on individual 
case conceptualisations of the difficulties instead of aiming for a manualised 
treatment approach. Research on the effectiveness of psychological therapies 
continues to identify factors related to outcome that go beyond the type and 
severity of symptoms. For example, individual differences in cognitive 
flexibility, motivation, expectations, and intelligence all play a part in how well 
an individual responds to therapy (Shoham-Solomon & Hannah, 1991). In 
addition, individuals with OCD (checking subtype) have already been shown to 
differ in terrns of their underlying reasons for checking and the nature of the 
checking itself (McKay et al. 2004). Future research may need to control for 
these differences when examining treatment response. 
Finally, the lack of support for the research hypotheses in this study does 
not necessarily have negative implications for cognitive theories and treatment of 
OCD. Descriptive measures, along with the qualitative information collected 
during the assessment session, suggested that dysfunctional beliefs play an 
important role in the development and maintenance of OCD. In addition, inflated 
responsibility beliefs and intolerance of uncertainty appeared to be particularly 
relevant, supporting recent theories of checking compulsions (Rachman, 2002). It 
is also important to acknowledge that participants generally gave low ratings of 
memory detail and confidence and high ratings of urge to check and anxiety 
during the experiments which is consistent with the factors identified as 
important in the maintenance cycle of checking behaviours. In his recent theory, 
Rachman (2002) highlights the complexity of OCD (checking subtype) through 
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proposing that there are three main components of treatment: a) a reduction in 
the core belief of inflated responsibility; b) modification of the maladaptive 
cognitive misinterpretations of one's out-of-control bizarre behaviour and the 
impaired confidence in one's memory; and c) use of response prevention tactics. 
Rachman argues that each component deals with a specific aspect of compulsive 
checking and it is therefore essential to address all three in order to produce 
dependable and significant reductions in compulsive checking behaviour 
(Rachman, 2002). The results in this study, therefore, may not be surprising 
given that the experiments focused only on one small component of treatment. 
The suggestion that this study may provide further evidence of the limited value 
of cognitive treatments in CBT is perhaps premature and it is instead necessary 
to conduct further research into the effects of different components of treatment 
highlighted by Rachman (2002). Indeed, the debate around the effectiveness of 
treatments in the OCD literature may actually be due to the reliance on 
manualised treatment procedures in research rather than a more individualized 
treatment programme. 
4.3.2 Clinical and research implications of the study. 
A major limitation of the current study is the small sample size. It is 
possible that a larger sample may have found more consistency in the results 
which would have led to more meaningfid conclusions. Recruitment difficulties 
in clinical populations are common, with larger studies typically using 
undergraduate samples. However, this usually means that any conclusions related 
to the theory and treatment of psychological difficulties is limited to non-clinical 
populations. In the current study, only 33% of participants expressed an interest 
in the study. Reasons for this are unclear and are further restricted by ethical 
guidelines on access to information. The rate of suitable referrals to clinical 
psychology departments was also lower than expected, with a period of 
approximately two months of no new referrals. It is possible that some of this 
was due to major changes taking place in the NHS Trust with regard to the 
waiting list system during the data collection period. However, it may also be 
that individuals with OCD are either not seeking psychological treatment as often 
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or are being referred to other services within the Health Service, such as Primary 
Care Services. Future research would need to investigate this further in order to 
increase chances of obtaining a larger sample. 
The small sample size also limited the statistical conclusions of the study. 
Although calculation of the change score is seen as a crucial part of the visual 
analysis in single case design (Franklin, Gorman, Beasley, & Allison, 1996), it is 
preferable to use statistical methods to determine whether there is a significant 
difference between scores. However, in order to do this it would be necessary to 
obtain a sample larger than five. For example, other studies (e. g., Wells & 
Papageorgiou, 2001; Fisher & Wells, 2005b) have used a sample of at least eight 
to calculate a Wilcoxon's Signed Rank test, the usual method of analysis for this 
type of single case data. It would be more appropriate, therefore, for future 
research to aim for a sample of at least ten people. In addition, an advantage of 
the single-case design is its ability to allow for a quick change in experimental 
strategy to immediately track down the sources of intersubject variability 
(Barlow & Hersen, 1984). Because of recruitment difficulties and time 
constraints, the current study was not able to take advantage of this flexibility. 
The mixed picture presented in this study highlights the complexity of 
evaluating theories and treatments for a heterogeneous disorder such as OCD. it 
also suggests that previous Randomised Controlled Trials of Cognitive or 
Cognitive Behaviour Therapy may have missed important information on the 
primary processes of change through examining the treatment as a whole. In 
order to contribute to the advancement of treatment efficacy, therefore, there is a 
continued need to identify the critical ingredients of treatment (Abramowitz, 
Taylor, & McKay, 2005). Although it has not been possible to provide any firm 
conclusions in the current study, the ability to analyse individual data has been 
invaluable for helping with the interpretation of any change processes and in 
making the results more meaningful. Single case experimental research would 
therefore continue to help refine theories and treatments of OCD by identifying 
the cause-and-effect relationships behind what works for some individuals 
(Behar & Borkovec, 2003). 
Finally, the results in this study appeared to differ to results obtained in 
clinical practice which has important implications for experimental research. 
Because experimental manipulations of variables can essentially be seen as a 
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more systematic method of carrying out behavioural experiments in cognitive 
therapy, such research is ideal for clinicians to conduct as part of routine clinical 
practice. However, as the current study suggests, the timing of the experiments 
during therapy may be crucial to its effectiveness and outcome. For example, 
brief manipulations can be devised as either a pre-treatment 'mini-intervention' 
or as part of the treatment phase (McMillan & Morley, in press). The pre- 
treatment design would allow for an examination of a component of treatment 
outside of the context of therapy which is similar to the experimental sessions 
described in this study. The within-treatment mini-intervention, however, is 
conducted within a treatment context and may therefore be influenced by 
external factors. McMillan and Morley (in press) propose that the comparison of 
results from both a pre-treatment and within-treatment mini-intervention would 
allow for further exploration of any differences found and could potentially be a 
profitable research strategy for increasing our understanding of how complex 
treatments work. 
4.4 Final Conclusions 
The current study sought to make a contribution to research on cognitive 
theories of OCD and has led to some important areas of discussion in what is an 
often complex issue in the Clinical Psychology field. Two main points can be 
taken from the results of this study: first, that OCD is an extremely 
heterogeneous disorder that potentially lends itself to different theoretical models 
according to its presentation; and, secondly, that cognitive-behavioural treatment 
of OCD can be effectively refined and advanced through the use of experimental 
methods to dismantle cause-and-effect conclusions and provide an insight into 
what works in therapy. There is clearly a need to continue with research in this 
area, with a particular focus on the suitability of subtyping in OCD and the 
implications this has for treatment. Further identification of maladaptive 
cognitive safety behaviours in OCD will not only increase our understanding of 
the role of dysfunctional beliefs in its maintenance, but also allow for an 
understanding of how treatments for complex psychological problems work. 
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Appendix A: Participant invitation letter 
Version: 2 
Date of this version: 15.03.06 
Dear 
Re: A study examining the effect of different thinking styles on anxiety and 
urge to check 
I am writing to invite you to take part in a research project looking at the 
different thinking styles involved in checking behaviours. You are being invited 
to take part in the study because your name is currently on the waiting list for 
clinical psychology services in Leeds. 
Please note that you do not have to take part under any circumstances. The 
standard of your treatment and care will not be affected if you decide that you do 
not wish to take part. It will also not affect your waiting time to see a therapist. 
I would be very grateftil if you would take time to read through the enclosed 
Participant Information Sheet in order to decide if you are interested in taking 
part. If you are interested, I can meet with you to go through the information 
sheet and answer any questions that you may have about the study. You will then 
be given more than 24 hours to decide whether or not to take part. 
I would be extremely grateful if you would complete and return the enclosed slip 
in the pre-paid envelope provided. Please note that all replies will be kept 
confidential. Please also note that if you do reply at this stage it does not mean to 
say that you have to take part, only that you would like to discuss the matter 
further. If you would prefer to talk to me about the study, I can be contacted on 
0113 3432708 or by email (ugmsd@leeds. ac. uk). 




Psychologist in Clinical Training 
A study examining the effect of different thinking styles on 
anxiety and urge to clieck 
Participma Response Slip 
I am interested in fincling out more abOLIt the research proJect YI No 
and possibly in taking part. 
My name Is: 
My address is: 
Contact details 
I lome telephone number 
Is it OK to I cave a message oil your home-number YIý. S No 
Is it OK to leave a message oil your home number it'someone else NTS No 
answers the phone? 
Mohile tClepliOlIC 111-111111CE 
Is it OK to leave a message on your mobile-number an s\\-c 1-plio nc? YES No 
Is it OK to leave a 111CSSage Oil YOUr mobile number 11'someonc YFS No 
else answers the plione" 
The best times to contact nic are". 
I ý'niall address: 
Version: 2 
Date of this % ersion: I i. 03.06 
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Appendix B: Participant infonnation sheet 
LREC no: 06/Q 1108/15 version 2 Date 
15.03.06 
A study examining the effect of different thinking 
styles on anxiety and urge to check 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will 
involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss 
it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you 
would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to 
take part. 
Thank you for reading this. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The urge to repeatedly check something is a common problem which can be 
distressing for some people. It has been suggested that the ways in which we 
think about the need to check could be keeping the problem going. 
The purpose of the study is to find out whether certain types of thinking make 
people more anxious and more likely to check. The eventual aim is to develop 
better psychological treatments for people who repeatedly check. 
Taking part in this study is separate to receiving psychological treatment. If you 
decide to take part in this study, this will not affect your right to receive 
treatment in any way and your position on the waiting list will not change. 
Why have I been chosen? 
People who have been referred to clinical psychology services in Leeds are being 
invited to take part in the study. 
Do I have to take part? 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part 
you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent 
form. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and 
without giving a reason. A decision to withdraw at any time or a decision not to 
take part will not affect the treatment given by clinical psychology services. 
What will happen to me if I do take part? 
If you agree to take part, you will be asked to visit the clinical psychology 
department for an assessment. At the assessment you will complete several 
questionnaires that will take approximately 45 minutes to complete. If you are 
suitable for the study, you will be invited to take part in it. Once you agree to 
113 
take part I shall write to your GP to inform him or her that you have agreed to 
take part. This will be for information only and will not affect your position on 
the waiting list for psychological treatment. 
After the assessment meeting you will be asked to attend two sessions, preferably 
at the clinical psychology department. These sessions will last approximately one 
hour each and will involve some brief tasks in which clear instructions will be 
given before you decide to continue. It is likely that what you do as part of these 
two sessions would be similar to what you would be asked to do as part of 
routine treatment. 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
You may not make improvements in your difficulties during the time you are 
taking part in the research. However, people who take part in the study will do so 
while they are on the waiting list to be seen for psychological treatment. The 
time you spend on the waiting list at the clinical psychology department will be 
the same whether or not you decide to take part. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
The strategies you try out in the research sessions may be similar to the strategies 
you are asked to try out as part of the treatment you receive from clinical 
psychology. You may find the research sessions help you with your difficulties. 
However, this cannot be guaranteed. 
The information we get from this study may help us to treat other people who are 
experiencing similar types of difficulties. 
What happens when the research study stops? 
The results of the research will be written up for publication in a psychology 
journal. 
What if something goes wrong? 
If you are harmed by taking part in the research project, there are no special 
compensation arrangements. If you are harmed due to someone's negligence, 
then you may have grounds for a legal action but you may have to pay for it. 
Regardless of this, if you wish to complain, or have any concerns about any 
aspect of the way you have been approached or treated during the course of this 
study, normal National Health Service complaints mechanisms should be 
available to you. 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
All information collected as part of this study will be kept confidential and 
anonymous. All materials used in the study will be stored in a locked cupboard 
within a locked room. 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The results of the study will be published as an article in a psychology journal so 
that other psychologists can find out about the research. Once the results are 
published you can be given a copy of the article if you want one. It will not be 
possible to identify who you are from any published results. 
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Who is organising and funding the research? 
The research is jointly organised by: 
" The Acadcrnic Unit of Psychiatry and Behavioural Sciences, University of' 
Leeds 
" The Leeds Mental II ealth Teach i ng NIIS Trust 
Who has reviewed the study? 
Tile study has been reviewed by York Research Ethics Committee 
Who should I contact for further information? 
If YOU have any questions about the StUdy PICaSC COntaCt StaCeý' 
Psychologist in Clinical Training, Academic Unit of Psychiatry and Beha\ ioural 
Sciences, University ot'Leeds (tel: 0 113 3432708, C111all '. LIgnISLI(O lecds. ac. 11k). 
If you agree to take part in the study you will be given a copy oftlils 
information sheet to keep. 
You will also be asked to sign a consent form, and you will be given 
a copy of that form to keep. 
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Appendix C: Weekly Obsession and Compulsion Index - adapted 
(WOCI; Single Case Research and Practice Group, unpublished). 
" Intrusive thoughts are repeated Ideas or images that are unwanted. You may feel they are 
senseless or out of place. 
" Rituals are behaviours or mental acts that you feel an urge to do. You may do them even 
though you see them as excessive. 
" Examples of behaviours include washing your hands, checking, and putting objects in a 
certain order. Examples of mental acts include counting repeatedly and saying certain words 
to yourself I 
1. During the last week, how distressing have you found your intrusive thoughts? 
012345678 
Not at all A little Moderately Very Extremely 
distressing distressing distressing distressing 
2. During the last week, how strong has the urge been to carry out your rituals? 
02 34 567 8 
No urge Slight urge Moderately Very strong Extremely 
at all strong urge urge strong urge 
3. During the last week, how many times have you carried out vour rituals? 
012 34 567 8 
Not at all Occasionally About half Most of the All of the 
of the time time time 
4. During the last week, how much have the intrusive thoughts and rituals Interfered with 
your life (e. g., family relationship s, work, social life)? 
012 34 567 8 
Not at Interfered a Moderately Very Extremely 
all little interfering interfering interfering 
5. Please use this scale to rate how much you currently believe each of the listed 
thoughts: 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Do not Completely 
believe the convinced the 
thought at thought is true 
all 
a) I must do everything I possibly 
can to stop harm from occurring. 
b)lt is important to have certainty 
in life. 
c)l should be able to control my 
thoughts. 
d) Bad thoughts can make bad 
things happen. 
e)Thinking a bad thought makes 
me a bad person. 
i)l must do things perfectly. 
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6. Please use this scale to rate how much you use each strategy to trv to prevent your 
checking behaviours: 
0 10 20 30 
Do not use 
this strategy at 
all to reduce 
checking 
a) Searching your memory for a 
clear picture 





40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
Always use this strategy 
to reduce checking 
c) Try to reason with yourself that 
you did check correctly 
e) Try to accept that you will 
never be certain 
i) 
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Appendix D: Rating scales 
1. Please put a mark through the following line at the point which represents how 





2. Please put a mark through the following line at the point which represents how 
confident you are in the accuracy of your memory of the event RIGHT NOW: 
0 
absolutely not confident 
100 
absohilely confident 
3. Please put a mark through the following line at the point which represents your 
urge to check RIGHT NOW: 
0 100 
I do notfeel the urge 
to check at all 
my urge to check could 
not be any stronger 
4. Please put a mark through the following line at the point which represents how 
anxious you feel RIGHT NOW: 
0 
not at all 
anxiousIdistressed 
the most anxiousIdistressed 
I hewe ever been 
100 
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Appendix E: Feedback questionnaire 
Research code 
A study examining the effect of different thinking slyles on anxie! y and urge to 
check: Feedback questionnaire 
Thank you for taking part in the above study. As discussed in our last meeting, 
your views on how the study went are very important to me. I would be grateful 
if you could fill in this questionnaire and return it to me in the pre-paid envelope 
provided. Any information you provide will be anonymous and used only for the 
purpose of the study. 
Thank you for your participation. 
1) How easy did you feel it was to follow the instructions of the researcher? 
Very easy m 
Easy El 
Neither easy or difficult 11 
Difficult n 
Very difficult 11 
Further comments: 
2) How helpful did you feel taking part in the study was? 
Very helpful 13 
Helpful 1: 1 






3) Have you used any of the techniques that you learnt in the sessions since 




4) Have things changed for the better or worse since completing the study? 
Changed for the better El 
No change 13 
Changed for the worse El 
Further comments: 
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Prior to taking consent: As you are aware, this study will involve taking part in a number 
of brief tasks that askyou to try out different ideas. Although nothing we do will cause 
you any harm, they may not necessarily do you any good I would therefore ask you to 
not repeat any of the techniques used in this study outside of this research room. 
Checklist 
Has participant read information sheet? Ycs/no 
Has participant had opportunity to ask questions? Yes/no 
Has participant signed consent form? Ycs/no 
Psychometric assessment 
Mini International Neuropsychiatric Interview: 
OCD current: yes C3 no [3 
OCD due to medical condition: yes no [] 
Substance induced OCD: yes E3 no [: 1 
Other difficulties: yes C3 no D 
If yes, specify: 
Does participant meet criteria for study? Yes/no 
If no: Unfortunately, even though you engage in some checking behaviours, you do not 
meet the criteria setfor this study (complicated and various t)pes. Your type isn't 
included in this study but is serious enough to be offered treatment). Thank youfor 
taking the time to come today. I would like to remindyou that this session is independent 
of any treatment you will receivefirom the psychology department and)-our name will 
continue to be on the waiting list. You will be contacted by the psychology department 
once your name moves to the top of the list. 
if yes: I would now like you to complete several more questionnaires that look in more 
detail at some of the problems you may be experiencing. These questionnaires should 
take approximately 30 minutes to complete. 
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Becks Depression Inventory If: 
Subtotal score 1: 
Subtotal score 2: 
Total score: 
Beck Anxiety Inventory: 
Total score: 
Clark-Beck Obsessive Compulsive Inventory: 
Subtotal score 1: 






Weekly Obsession and Compulsion Index completed: yes no 0 
Main beliefs highlighted in WOU 
......................................................................................................... 
................................................................................................... 
Does participant meet criteria for the study? Yes/no 
Overview of checking situations 
I am now going to askyou about some of the iýpical situations that cause you to 
repeatedly check. I amparticularly interested in the times when you arefeeling very 
anxious. 
What types of things do you usually 
check? ................................................................................................................. 
........................................................... 
Anything else? ......................................................................................................... 
How often would you say that you check (inserifeared stimuli)? 
............................................................................................. 
If you weren't able to check, how anxious would you fccl on a scale of zero to one 
hundred percent? .......................................................................................................... 
What normally goes on in your mind if you cant check? ............................................ 
............................................................ ..... 
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Repeat questions for other checking behaviours 
Fear provoking stimuli 1: 
Fear provoking stimuli 2: 
Semi-structured interview 
(focus on areas highlighted in the WOCI) 
Inflated responsibility: 
What do you feel would happen if you didn't check (insertfeared stimuli)? 
......................................................................................................... 
................................................................................................... Prompt - If you didn't check could anything bad happen? ..................................... 
Who would be held responsible if something bad happened? 
......................................................................................................... 
....................................................................................... 
How responsible would you be in percentage terms? 
......................................................................................................... 
.................................................................................... 
Inflated risk/intolerance of uncertainty: 
How certain would you have to be to not go back and check? .............................. 
If there was aI in a hundred chance , would you still need to go back and check? 
............................ 
What about aI in a thousand chance? .................................................................... 
What about aI in a million chance? ...................................................................... 
What would you say the likelihood is that (inserifeared stimuli)'? .................................. 
Thought Action Fusion: 
Could anything happen just by having these thoughts? 
......................................................................................................... 
Does having a thought increase the likelihood of something happening?. 
......................................................................................................... 
Does having these thoughts change how you view yourself (prompt - some people may 








Is it possible to stop your thoughts if you worked hard enough? 
Checklist 2 
Has the participant agreed to continue with the experiments? Yes/no 
Has the participant had the opportunity to ask questions? Yes/no 
Has a letter been written to the GP? Yes/no 
Date of next session: 




As I mentioned in the participant information sheet, this session will last about an hour 
and will involve doing some brief tasks. These brief tasks will involve you being exposed 
to situations that usually cause you to check. You may therefore expect tojeel a little 
anxious. Clear instructions will be given. You arefree to withdrawfrom the tasks at any 
time. Is there anything you would like to ask me before we begin? 
Am I satisfied the participant is still willing to take part in the study? Yes/no 
During the tasks I will askyou tillfill in some rating scales (show scales to participant). 
At three dififerentpoints in time I will askyou to pause whatyou are doing andfill in 
these rating scales. I would like you to read each question carefully and rate them on the 
scale ofzero to one hundred according to how youfeel at that particular time. It is very 
important that youfill in the scales as quickly as possible. It may help ifyou spend a 
couple of minutesfamiliarising yoursel(with the scales now so thatyou are able to rate 
them quickly. 
Baseline experiment A 
Thefirst task will involve you spending afew minutes in a situation that usually causes 
you to check. In our last session we discovered that (insert fearcd stimuli) causes you the 
most problems and increases your anxiety. 
I will shortly be taking you to a room with (insert fearcd stimuli) and I would like you to 
spend afew minutes checking that (insert fcared stimuli). 
We will then return to this room and I will ask you to spendfive minutes doing whalyou 
normally do when you havejust checked something (with the exception ofgoing back to 
check). 
During thisfive minutes I will give you the rating scales and ask you to rate them 
according to how you are currentlyfeeling at that time. You will be asked to rate these 
scales at three points during thisfive minutes. 
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Don't worry ifyou cannot remember all the instructions I have given youjust now, I will 
repeat them as we go along. 
Am I confident that the participant has understood what is required? Yes/no 
Exposure to feared stimuli 
Current time: 
I will now take you along to (insert feared stimuli). 
Time upon returning to room: 
I would likeyou to spendfive minutes doing whatyou normally do when you havejust 
checked something (with the exception ofgoing back to check). 
At three dififerentpoints in time I will askyou to pause whatyou are doing andfill in the 
rating scales (show VAS to participant). Don't spend too long thinking about an answer. 
Fill them in as quickly as you can. Yourfirst response is likely to be the most accurate. 
Do you thinkyou understand what to do? Are you ready to begin the task? 
Do I feel this participant understands what is required of them? Yes/no 
TIME at start of experiment: 
One minute interval: 
Please stop what you are doing and rate the scales now 
TIME: 
Three minute interval: 
Please stop what you are doing and rate the scales now 
TIME: 
Five minute interval: 
Please stop what you are doing and rate the scales now 
TIME: 
We have now completed the task. ShoHly I will ask you to move onto the next task. 
Counterbalance exveriments 
We will now repeat the experiment two more times. These experiments will be exactly 
the same as the one you havejust completed; however, instead ofspending thefive 
minutes doing what you normally do, I will ask you to take part in two different tasks. I 
will read out the instructions to you as we go along. Do you understand? 
Counterbalance condition B 
I will shortly be taking you back to the room with (insert feared stimuli) and I would like 
you to spend afew minutes checking that (insert feared stimuli). 
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We will then return to this room and I will ask you to spendfive minutes takingpart in a 
simple computer task. This will involve looking at several different pictures and deciding 
which ones you have seen before. 
During thisfive minutes I will show you the same rating scales that you completed in the 
first task and askyou to rate them according to how you are currentlyfeeling at that 
time. You will be asked to rate these scales at three points during this five minutes. It is 
important that you fill them in as quickly as you can. 
Don't worry ifyou cannot remember all the instructions I have given youjust now, I will 
repeat them as we go along. 
Do youfeel happy to continue with the task? 
Am I confident that the participant has understood what is required? Yes/no 
Exposure to feared stimuli 
Current time: 
I will now take you along to (insert feared stimuli). 
Time upon returning to room: 
"en you are ready, this computer will keep showing different pictures of (insert feared 
stimuli). Each picture will remain on the screenforfive seconds before it changes to the 
next picture. Each time you see a new picture, I would like you to tell me whether you 
think is it the same as the (insert feared stimuli) you were exposed to earlier. Do you 
understand? 
Helpfulness rating: how helpful to do you think this strategy will be in managing 
your anxiety? ................................................................................................................. 
At three differentpoints in time Iwill askyou topause whatyou are doing andfill in the 
rating scales (show VAS to participant). Don't spend too long thinking about an answer. 
Fill them in as quickly as you can. Yourfirst response is likely to be the most accurate. 
Do you thinkyou understand what to do? Are you ready to begin the task? 
Do I feel this participant understands what is required of them? Yes/no 
TIME at start of experiment: 
One minute interval: 
Please stop what you are doing and rate the scales now 
TIME: 
Three minute interval: 
Please stop what you are doing and rate the scales now 
TIME: 
Five minute interval: 
Please stop what you are doing and rate the scales now 
TIME: 
126 
We have now completed the task. Shortly I will ask you to move onto the next task. 
Manipulation check: how well do you feel you did in the tasks? ............................ 
to what extent did you manage to focus on the task rather 
than checking? ........................................................................ 
Counterbalance condition C 
I will shortly be taking you back to the room with (insert feared stimuli) and I would like 
you to spend afew minutes checking that (insert feared stimuli). 
We will then return to this room and I will askyou to spendfive minutes taking part in a 
memory search. Before you do this, I will read out a description so that you understand 
what a memory search is. 
During thisfive minutes I will showyou the same rating scales that you completed in the 
first task and askyou to rate them according to how you are currentlyfeeling at that 
time. You will be asked to rate these scales at three points during thisfive minutes. It is 
important that youfill them in as quickly as you can. 
Don't worry ifyou cannot remember all the instructions I have given youjust now, I will 
repeat them as we go along. 
Do youfeel happy to continue with the task? 
Am I confident that the participant has understood what is required? Yes/no 
Exposure to feared stimuli 
Current time: 
I will now take you along to (insert feared stimuli). 
Time upon returning to room: 
Present rationale 1: Memory searching and answer any questions 
I would like you to try this 'memory searching'techniquefor the nextfive minutes. Do 
you think you understand what is required ofyou? 
Helpfulness rating: how helpful to do you think this strategy will be in managing 
your anxiety? ................................................................................................................. 
At three dififerentpoints in time I will askyou to pause whatyou are doing andfill in the 
rating scales (show VAS to participant). Don't spend too long thinking about an answer. 
Fill them in as quickly as you can. Yourfirst response is likely to be the most accurate. 
Do you think you understand what to do? Are you ready to begin the task? 
Do I feel this participant understands what is required of them? Yes/no 
TIME at start of experiment: 
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One minute interval: 
Please stop what you are doing and rate the scales now 
TIME: 
Three minute interval: 
Please stop what you are doing and rate the scales now 
TIME: 
Five minute interval: 
Please stop what you are doing and rate the scales now 
TIME: 
We have now completed the task. Shortly I will ask you to move onto the next task. 
Manipulation check: how well do you feel you completed the task? ......................... 
to what extent did you manage to focus on the task rather 
than checking? ................................................................ 
Debrief 
As I mentioned in the assessment session, the brief tasks completed in this session will 
not cause you any harm but may also not do you any good Please do not attempt to use 
the strategies learnt in this session outside of the research room 




This session will last about an hour and will involve doing some brief tasks similar to 
our last session. These brief tasks will involve you being exposed to situations that 
usually cause you to check. You may therefore expect tojeel a little anxious. Clear 
instructions will be given before you decide whether to continue. You arefree to 
withdrawfrom the tasks at any time. Is there anythingyou would like to ask me before 
we begin? 
Am I satisfied the participant is still willing to take part in the study? Yes/no 
During the tasks I will ask you tillfill in the same rating scales as in the last session 
(show scales to participant). At three differentpoints in time I will askyou to pause what 
you are doing andfill in these rating scales. I would like you to read each question 
carefully and rate them on the scale ofzero to one hundred according to how youfeel at 
that particular time. It is very important that youfill in the scales as quickly as possible. 
It may help ifyou spend a couple of minutes jamiliarising yourseIrwith the scales again 
so that you are able to rate them quickly. 
Baseline exiDeriment A 
Thefirst task will involve you spending afew minutes in a situation that usually causes 
you to check. In the assessment session we discovered that (insert feared stimuli) causes 
you some of the most problems and increases your anxiety. 
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I will shortly be taking you to a room with (insert feared stimuli) and I would like you to 
spend afew minutes checking that (insert feared stimuli). 
We will then return to this room and I will askyou to spendfive minutes doing what you 
normally do when you havejust checked something (with the exception ofgoing back to 
check). 
During thisfive minutes I will give you the rating scales and ask you to rate them 
according to how you are currentlyfeeling at that time. You will be asked to rate these 
scales at three points during thisfive minutes. 
Don't worry ifyou cannot remember all the instructions I have given youjust now, I will 
repeat them as we go along. 
Am I confident that the participant has understood what is required? Yes/no 
Exposure to feared stimuli 
Current time: 
I will now take you along to (insert feared stimuli). 
Time upon returning to room: 
I would like you to spendfive minutes doing what you normally do when you havejust 
checked something (with the exception ofgoing back to check). 
At three differentpoints in time I will askyou to pause whalyou are doing andfill in the 
rating scales (show VAS to participant). Don't spend too long thinking about an answer. 
Fill them in as quickly as you can. Yourfirst response is likely to be the most accurate. 
Do you think you understand what to do? Are you ready to begin the task? 
Do I feel this participant understands what is required of them? Yes/no 
TIME at start of experiment: 
One minute interval: 
Please stop what you are doing and rate the scales now 
TIME: 
Three minute interval: 
Please stop what you are doing and rate the scales now 
TIME: 
Five minute interval: 
Please stop what you are doing and rate the scales now 
TIME: 
We have now completed the task. Shortly I will ask you to move onto the next task. 
Counterbalance experiments 
We will now repeat the experiment two more times. These experiments will be exactly 
the same as the one you havejust completed, however, instead ofspending thefive 
minutes doing what you normally do, I will ask you to take part in two different tasks. 
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These tasks will be different to the ones we completed in the last session. I will read out 
the instructions to you as we go along. Do you understand? 
Counterbalance condition B 
I will shortly be takingyou back to the room with (insert feared stimuli) andI would like 
you to spend afew minutes checking that (insert feared stimuli). 
We will then return to this room and I will askyou to spendfive minutes answering some 
specific questions that allow you to reason with yourself. Before you do this, I will read 
out a rationale andprovide you with a list of questions. 
During thisfive minutes I will show you the same rating scales that you completed in 
thefirst task and askyou to rate them according to how you are currentlyfeeling at that 
time. You will be asked to rate these scales at three points during thisfive minutes. It is 
important that youfill them in as quickly as you can. 
Don't worry ifyou cannot remember all the instructions I have given youjust now, I will 
repeat them as we go along. 
Do youfeel happy to continue with the task? 
Am I conrident that the participant has understood what is required? Yes/no 
Exposure to feared stimuli 
Current time: 
I will now take you along to (insert feared stimuli). 
Time upon returning to room: 
Present rationale 3: 'Reasoning with the self' and answer any questions 
I would like you to spendfive minutes using these questions as a guide to reason with 
yourself about whether (insert feared stimuli). Do you think you understand what is 
required ofyou? 
Helpfulness rating: how helpful to do you think this strategy will be in managing 
your anxiety? ................................................................................................................. 
At three differentpoints in time I will askyou to pause whatyou are doing andfill in the 
rating scales (show VAS to participant). Don't spend too long thinking about an answer. 
Fill them in as quickly as you can. Yourfirst response is likely to be the most accurate. 
Do you think you understand what to do? Are you ready to begin the task? 
Do I feel this participant understands what is required of them? Yes/no 
TIME at start of experiment: 
One minute interval: 
Please stop what you are doing and rate the scales now. 
TIME: 
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Three minute interval: 
Please stop what you are doing and rate the scales now 
TIME: 
Five minute interval: 
Please stop whatyou are doing and rate the scales now. 
TIME. - 
We have now completed the task. Shortly I will ask you to move onto the next task 
Manipulation check: how well do you feel you completed the task? ........... ........... 
to what extent did you manage to focus on the task rather 
than checking ? .......................................................................... 
Counterbalance condition C 
I will shortly be taking you back to the room with (insert feared stimuli) and I would like 
you to spend afew minutes checking that (insert feared stimuli). 
We will then return to this room and I will askyou to spendfive minutes taking part in a 
task that involves accepting uncertainty. Before you do this, I will read out a rationale 
so that you understand what accepting uncertainty is. 
During thisfive minutes I will showyou the same rating scales that you completed in the 
first task and ask you to rate them according to how you are currentlyfeeling at that 
time. You will be asked to rate these scales at three points during thisfive minutes. It is 
important that youfill them in as quickly as you can. 
Don't worry ifyou cannot remember all the instructions I have given youjust now, I will 
repeat them as we go along 
Do youfeel happy to continue with the task? 
Am I confident that the participant has understood what is required? Yes/no 
Exposure to feared stimuli 
Current time: 
I will now take you along to (insert feared stimuli). 
Time upon returning to room: 
Present rationale 4: 'accepting uncertainty' and answer any questions 
I would like you to try this 'accepting uncertainty' techniquefor the nextfive minutes. 
Do you think you understand what is required ofyou? 
Helpfulness rating: How helpful to do you think this strategy will be in managing 
your anxiety? ................................................................................................................. 
At three differentpoints in time Iwill askyou topause whatyou are doing andfill in the 
rating scales (show VAS to participant). Don't spend too long thinking about an answer. 
Fill them in as quickly as you can. Yourfirst response is likely to be the most accurate. 
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Do you thinkyou understand what to do? Are you ready to begin the task? 
Do I feel this participant understands what is required of them? Yes/no 
TIME at start of experiment: 
One minute interval: 
Please stop what you are doing and rate the scales now. 
TIME: 
Three minute interval: 
Please stop what you are doing and rate the scales now. 
TIME: 
Five minute interval: 
Please stop what you are doing and rate the scales now. 
TIME: 
We have now completed the task. Shortly I will ask you to move onto the next task. 
Manipulation check: how well do you think you completed the task? .................. 
to what extent do you feel you managed to focus on the task 
rather than checking to? ........................................................... 
Debrief 
Thank youfor taking part in this study. The results of the study will be published as an 
article in a psychologyjournal once it is complete. However this may not befor a couple 
ofyears. Once the results are published you can be given a copy of the article ifyou 
want one. It will not be possible to identify who you arefrom any published results. 
Do you think you would like a copy of the article? Yes/no 
This study aims to identify tasks that may be usefulfor people who repeatedly check. 
Some of the tasks used in the experiments are predicted to be helpful and some are 
predicted to be unhelpful. In thefirst experiment I askedyou to do a memory search. It is 
predicted that this strategy will be unhelpful and increase our anxiety. This is because 
we do not tend to hold a clear memory of everyday events such as (insert relevantfeared 
stimuli). Deliberately NOT searching our memory may therefore be helpful. 
In the second experiment I askedyou to reason with yoursetf by answering particular 
questions. Again, this strategy is predicted to be unhelpful as it highlights that we are 
not 100% certain that we performed an action. Instead, we predict that accepting 
uncertainty will be a helpful strategyfor people who repeatedly check. If we accept that 
there is no such thing as certainty in life then it may help usfeel less anxious about 
whether we have performed an action. 
The experiments used in this study are similar to the experiments used in Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy when you start treatment. "at we often do is manipulate what we 
think is aproblem by makingyou do more of it and then stoppingyoufrom doing it. Me 
then compare the difference between the two. I would be interested to know your 
thoughts on the tasks in this study that are predicted to be helpful and whether youfeel 
that they may be helpfulfor you in thefuture? 
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As part of the study, I would like to send participants afeedback questionnaire in 
approximatelyfour weeks time. This questionnaire is voluntary and will ask about your 
views ofhow youfound takingpart in the study. Any information you provide on this 
questionnaire will be anonymous and used onlyfor the purpose of the study. 
Are you happy for me to send you the feedback questionnaire in approximately 4 
weeks time? 
Yes/no signed ......................................... 
I would like to remindyou that this research was independent of any treatment you will 
receivefrom the psychology department andyour name will continue to be on the 
waiting list. You will be contacted by the psychology department once your name moves 
to the top of the list. 
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Appendix G: Consent fonn 
Centre Number: 
Study Number: 
Patient Identification Number: 
CONSENT FORM 
(Version no. 2; Date of this version: 15.03.06) 
Title of Project: A study examining the effect of different thinking styles on anxiety and 
urge to check 
Full title: Maladaptive cognitive processes during exposure in people with OCD (checking 
subtype) 
Name of Researcher: 
I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated ................... 
Fl 
(version ............ ) 
for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
Please initial box 
2.1 understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw F1 
at any time, without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal rights 
being affected. 
3.1 understand that my participation will not affect my access to treatment in any wayF] 
4.1 agree to take part in the above study. F-I 
Name of Participant 
Signature 
Date 
Name of Person taking consent Signature Date 
(if different from researcher) 
Researcher Signature Date 
I for patient; I for researcher; I to be kept with hospital notes 
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I write to inform you that the above patient, who was recently referred to clinical 
psychology, has been invited to participate in a research project and has 
consented to do so. 
The study is examining the effect of different thinking styles on anxiety and urge 
to check. The study will involve participation in two experimental sessions 
lasting approximately one hour each. Taking part in this research will neither 
improve nor worsen the patient's place on the clinical psychology waiting list and 
is separate 
to any psychological treatment they will receive 
It should be noted that the project has been approved by the relevant local 
research ethics committee. 
If you would like more details about the project, then please contact me either at 
the above address, by telephone (0113 3432708), or email (ugmsd@leeds. ac. uk). 
Yours sincerely 
Stacey Robson 
Psychologist in Clinical Training 
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Appendix 1: Calculation of the mean change score 
The mean change scores for experiment I were calculated as follows: 
For each participant, the 1,3, and 5 minute ratings were added together and divided by 
three to get the mean rating for the baseline condition (A) and the two experimental 
tasks (B & C): 
Participant Mean ratings of detailed memories 
Base line Computer task Memory search 
1 60.67 40.00 56.33 
2* 60.00 50.00 50.00 
3* 56.67 56.67 73.33 
4 90.00 53.33 83.33 
5* 70.00 46.67 60.00 
Total mean 1 67.47 49.33 64.6 
For ABC (baseline, computer task, memory search) participants, the change score for the 
computer task was calculated by subtracting the mean rating of the baseline from the 
mean rating of the computer task. Similarly, the change score for the memory search 
task was calculated by subtracting the mean rating of the computer task from the mean 
rating of the memory search. 







Detail -20.67 16.33 
Confident -6.33 13 
Urge to check 7.33 -10 
Anxiety 5 -8 
For ACB (baseline, memory search, computer task) participants, the change score for the 
computer task was calculated by subtracting the mean rating of the memory search from 
the mean rating of the computer task. Similarly, the change score for the memory search 
task was calculated by subtracting the mean rating of the baseline from the mean rating 
of the memory search. 
e. g., participant 2. 




Detail -10 0 
Confident -10 0 
Urge to check -13.33 -6.67 
Anxiety . 16.67 -6.67 
A mean change score for the computer task was calculated by adding the change scores 
for each participant and dividing them by five. The mean change score for the memory 
search task was calculated in the same way. 
